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Previous research indicates that emotion is an important factor in shaping attitudes towards war. 
Specifically, studies have shown that the experience of anger leads to increased support for war. 
However, little is known about the mechanisms and boundary conditions of the anger-war 
attitudes effect. In this dissertation, I propose three potential mechanisms: time perspective, 
changes in risk perception and preference, and cognitive control. Results indicated risk 
perception and preference and cognitive control were not related to either anger or war attitudes. 
The consideration of future consequences (CFC) scale, used to measure time perspective, 
revealed only weak effects as a mediator.  However, there was much stronger evidence of its role 
as a moderator.  In particular, participants’ position along the CFC scale—their tendency to 
exhibit or not exhibit a focus on the future—did determine the nature of the relationship between 
anger and war attitudes. People who focused on the present became more pro-war as their anger 
increased.  Therefore, focusing on present or future consequences appears to be an important 
factor in war opinion formation. Implications of these results and ideas for future research are 
discussed.  
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Introduction 
Few public policy issues are of greater importance than waging war.  Military conflicts are 
inherently matters of life and death for both soldiers waging the battles against one another, and 
the civilians trapped in between.  The preparation for, and the execution of, military actions are 
also of enormous monetary cost.  In the United States, defense spending for fiscal year 2011 was 
$718 billion, accounting for 20% of the country’s total federal budget (cbpp.org, 2012).  For 
these reasons and the myriad of other facets of society impacted by war, it is critical that we 
acquire a more substantial understanding of the factors that influence the public’s support for 
war. This is the overriding motivation for the present set of experiments. 
In this dissertation my main focus was on anger and the role it might play in driving 
people to support war more than they otherwise would.  One important clarification of my 
research goals is worth noting at the outset.  The central purpose of my research was not simply 
to show that anger tends to promote greater support for war.  This assertion is not particularly 
noteworthy (although, as I will discuss presently, there is less direct empirical evidence for this 
relation than one might suppose).  Rather, my main focus was on the reasons why anger might 
produce this kind of effect.    
Of course, the most obvious mechanism to explain anger’s effect on war attitudes is to 
simply assume that anger increases aggression, and that these higher rates of aggression are 
causing the increased support for war.  On the one hand, it is obviously true that the emotion of 
anger is intertwined with aggressive thought and action (Berkowitz, 1990).  To this extent, it is 
reasonable to suppose that experimental induction of anger would, in turn, increase the 
likelihood that people would generally be more receptive to aggressive actions and policies, 
including those carried out by the government.  On a theoretical level, however, it is ultimately 
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unsatisfying to simply conclude that “anger makes people think and act in aggressive ways” and 
simply view any links between anger and pro-war attitudes as part of the overall cycle of 
aggression.  This position is a theoretical dead-end, offering no further insight into anger other 
than the knowledge that angry emotion leads to angry attitudes.  I was interested in 
understanding why anger might affect attitudes, especially given that there could be more than 
one mechanism driving this effect.  
 For this introduction, I first briefly discuss and explain some key terminology that is used 
throughout the dissertation; this discussion is important in order to clarify the points to be made 
later.  Next, I consider the literature that is relevant to the relation between anger and pro-war 
attitudes, with special attention to some less-than-obvious complexities that are relevant to these 
considerations.  Following this, I present three hypotheses that are relevant to the issue of why, 
exactly, anger might have a systematic effect on these attitudes. Because anger’s impact on war 
attitudes is most certainly due to a host of biological, motivational, and cognitive processes, a 
complete understanding of these mechanisms is not possible in one set of studies.  However, I 
elected to study three possible mechanisms in particular: consideration of future consequences, 
changes in risk, and limitations on cognitive control.  The overarching goal of the present 
research is to test for these variables as possible mediators of anger’s causal influence on 
attitudes towards war. 
DEFINITION OF KEY CONSTRUCTS 
Emotion vs. Mood 
 In the social and personality literature, psychologists sometimes have made a 
distinction between emotions versus moods when referring to internal affective states (Schwarz, 
2007).  Strictly speaking, emotions have specific referents or objects whereas moods are more 
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general and typically do not have specific referents (Schwarz, 1990).  In principle, this 
distinction can be important, although the difference between emotions and moods is not so 
easily made in practice.  For example, if someone kicked your shin in the subway, it is likely that 
this action will put you in an angry mood, in addition to eliciting angry emotion toward the 
perpetrator.  It is also worth noting that the same techniques often used to measure mood (i.e., 
adjective checklist approach) are often used to measure emotion, and vice versa.  Hence, 
although the distinction between emotion and mood may be important in certain contexts, it is 
not especially critical here.  For the sake of consistency, however, I shall use the term “emotion” 
throughout the paper whenever I am referring to internal states of the participant. 
State vs. Trait-Based Differences in Emotion 
 In the present context, my main focus was on experimentally-induced (i.e., “state”) 
differences in anger, in which participants are randomly assigned to an anger inducing versus 
control task.  However, as with most other types of emotion, anger can also have trait-like 
properties, reflecting reasonably stable differences across people in terms of their chronic levels 
of anger. Whenever experimental designs seek to manipulate a particular variable, it can often be 
useful to measure, prior to the manipulation, pre-existing individual differences with respect to 
that construct.  At the very least, this approach can allow the researcher to covary out individual 
differences in the given construct, to permit a clearer assessment of the effect of the experimental 
manipulation.  However, depending on the context in which this strategy is employed, it is also 
possible that assessing these individual differences in combination with the experimental 
manipulation can yield more insight than if one merely focused on the experimental 
manipulation alone.  In my case, it is was not clear on a priori grounds how much, or even 
whether, trait-based anger would play a role in these studies.  Hence, in the discussion to follow, 
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I focus my primary attention on experimentally-induced anger, given that this provides the most 
leverage with respect to inferring causality.  However, it should be kept in mind that I also 
measured trait-based differences in anger prior to the experimental manipulations.  
ON THE EFFECTS OF ANGER ON WAR-RELATED ATTITUDES 
On intuitive grounds, one might naturally assume that there would be some relation 
between anger and attitudes toward war, especially when such attitudes pertain to militaristically 
aggressive actions and policies of one’s own government. This is generally what the literature 
shows.  For example, a number of recent studies (Huddy, Feldman, & Cassese, 2007; Sadler, 
Lineberger, Correll, & Park, 2005; Skitka, Bauman, Aramovich, & Morgan, 2006) have shown 
that angry (vs. non-angry) people are more likely to support aggressive actions by the United 
States in the context of the “war on terror” (e.g., show greater support for invading Iraq).    
All of these studies strongly suggest a positive relationship between anger and war 
attitudes.  However, they have two key limitations.  First, all of these studies used a 
nonexperimental design, precluding any definitive conclusions regarding the causal impact of 
anger on attitudes and allowing for the possibility that a third variable is affecting both 
constructs.  Second, most of this past research investigating the anger-war link used memories of 
a military conflict or attack (e.g., the events of 9/11 attacks) to elicit the emotion of anger.  
Hence, there was a perfect confounding with the dependent variable (attitudes toward war) and 
the factors that were used to elicit the emotion of anger in the first place, the latter of which were 
grounded in memories of a previous war.  As noted in Lambert, Scherer, Schott, Olson, 
Andrews, O’Brien, and Zisser (2010), studies that prime memories of past wars are explicitly 
increasing the accessibility of cognitions (e.g., speeches by presidents, memories of war-related 
broadcasts) that could also affect attitudes, over and above any consequences of activating the 
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emotion of anger.  Hence, if one wants to more effectively isolate the consequences of anger, it is 
preferable to activate that emotion using an experimental manipulation that has nothing directly 
to do with war or even politics in general. 
Such empirical demonstration must also show that there is something about anger per se 
on pro-war attitudes, as opposed to other negative emotions, or states of high arousal, that are 
correlated with this emotion.  I am aware of only one such study that meets these criteria, and 
that is the recent study published by Lambert et al. (2010).  Across four studies, this work 
showed that experimentally-induced anger (controlling for changes in other internal states, such 
as sadness, anxiety, or arousal) led to significant pro-war shifts in attitudes toward the Iraq War.  
Equally important, the magnitude of this effect was shown to be the same, regardless of whether 
anger was elicited in a context that was related to war (Experiments 1 and 2) or not (Experiments 
3 and 4).  In the latter case, angry mood was elicited by having participants write about an 
autobiographical event that had nothing to do with war or even politics in general. 
The “Why” Question 
Over and above the foregoing issues, one additional element is needed in order to fully 
understand any linkage between anger and attitudes towards war:  A research design must also 
be able to address why anger might be exerting this kind of effect. This includes a greater 
understanding of the conditions under which anger may, or may not, lead to increased support 
for war. Stated somewhat differently, it is important at the outset to establish that anger has a 
causal effect on war attitudes.  Although the number of studies that have shown evidence for this 
causal relation is surprisingly small, the available evidence does seem to support this conclusion 
(cf. Lambert et al., 2010).  However, such data does not speak directly to the processes by which 
anger might produce these sorts of effects, and the factors that might moderate when they do or 
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do not, occur. In the next section I present three potential mechanisms that are relevant to these 
considerations.    
PRESENTATION OF HYPOTHESES 
As described above, one of the overarching aims of my research is to understand why and 
how anger might lead to systematic changes in attitudes toward war.  In this research, I propose, 
and empirically test, three hypotheses that are relevant to this overarching aim, including the (a) 
time perspective hypothesis, (b) risk hypothesis, and (c) cognitive control hypothesis.  To 
anticipate a potential misunderstanding, these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive of one 
another.  For example, evidence that supports (or does not support) the first hypothesis does not 
bear directly on the validity of the other two.  Hence, each of these hypotheses should be 
considered as conceptually distinct from one another. 
THE TIME PERSPECTIVE HYPOTHESIS 
One possible mechanism driving anger’s causal impact on war support is the fact that 
angry people may not be thinking very much about the future.  That is, when people become 
angry, their attention is drawn away from the future and the upcoming consequences 
(Lowenstein, 1996).  There are several reasons why this might be so.  For one thing, many of the 
problems that make us angry have to do with events that have occurred in the past, especially 
those events that are perceived to violate one or more norms of justice.  As Michael Ross and his 
colleagues have noted (e.g., Starzyk, Blatz, & Ross, 2009), anger has extremely “long legs”, in 
the sense that people’s memories of past events, even those that have occurred centuries ago 
(e.g., an ancient battle between warring nations), often have the capacity to trigger hostilities 
among nations.  In this sense, anger represents a kind of “backward looking” emotion in the 
sense that this emotion is often rooted in one’s memories of things that have already happened.   
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The general tendency for anger to foster decreased consideration of the future could 
potentially account for several known consequences of this emotion.  For example, consider the 
traffic-induced experience of anger commonly known as “road rage”.  A driver becomes 
infuriated by a fellow drivers’ lack of automotive aptitude, and decides to pull over, get out of 
the vehicle, and act on his anger.  While in the heat of the moment, it is unlikely that the “rager” 
is carefully contemplating the future consequences of his actions.  Rather, he or she may be 
thinking in the short-term moment, “I’m going to get this guy for almost knocking me off the 
road!” rather than the long-term consequence “On second thought, I could hurt this person quite 
badly, and pay a lot of money in a lawsuit”.  As many of us know, this focus on the short-term 
can cause us to make ultimately poor decisions that fulfilled our immediate desires, but were 
harmful in the long-term.  
 The tendency for anger to shift attentional focus away from the future may very well 
transfer to conflicts of a larger scale, such as military conflicts.  When a nation is provoked by 
another nation or organization, the offended is likely to be more focused on meeting short-term 
goals (e.g., of revenge, or to bolster one’s immediate sense of security), as opposed to 
considering the future consequences of their present actions.  As history demonstrates (and as 
several writers have noted cf. Denson, 1999), the effects of war can include many long-term 
negative economic, societal, and military consequences that far outweigh the short-term goals 
achieved by engaging in war.  Based on this premise, I hypothesized that one of the mechanisms 
causing anger to increase support for war is the shift of focus to short-term over long-term 
consequences.   
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A Closer Look at the Time Perspective Construct 
The preceding discussion of time perspective is relevant to a much larger and rather 
diverse literature bearing on issues such as delay of gratification (Metcalf & Mischel, 1999; 
Mischel, 1966), “time perspective” (Zimbardo, 1999), delay discounting (Green, 1994), 
probability discounting (Green & Myserson, 2010), self-regulation (Baumeister & Heatherton, 
1996), impulsivity (Madden & Bickell, 2010), and the want/should conflict paradigm 
(Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, & Wade-Benzoni, 1998; Milkman, Rogers, & Bazerman, 2008) to name 
just a few areas of research.   
For the present purposes, the concept in this area of research that is most congruent with 
my hypotheses is the degree to which people are concerned with present and future 
consequences. The consideration of future consequences (CFC) construct was originally defined 
as “the extent to which people consider the potential distant outcomes of their current behaviors 
and the extent to which they are influenced by these potential outcomes” (Strathman, Gleicher, 
Boninger, & Edwards, 1994). Individuals who score low on the CFC scale are highly concerned 
with the immediate consequences of behavior and have little concern for the delayed 
consequences of their actions.  In contrast, people scoring high on the CFC scale place greater 
importance on future consequences and less importance on the immediate consequences of 
behavior.  Low CFC scores are related to a variety of behavioral outcomes including higher 
alcohol and cigarette use (Strathman et al., 1994), less exercise (Ouellette, 2005), lower sleep 
quality (Peters, Joireman, & Ridgway, 2005), and lower grade point average (Joireman, 1999).  
CFC is also related to attitudes towards pro-environmental behaviors (e.g., recycling) and some 
political issues (e.g., offshore-drilling) (Strathman et al., 1994).  Most importantly for the present 
research, the existing literature indicates that CFC is related to anger and aggression (Joireman, 
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Anderson, & Strathman, 2003).  Specifically, individuals scoring higher in anger tend to score 
lower on the CFC scale and vice versa, a finding that supports the idea that, compared to other 
individuals, angry people tend to be less concerned with the future.    
Mediation vs. Moderation 
 The CFC scale could potentially play two kinds of roles in the present context.  First, 
CFC could mediate the effect of anger on support for militaristically aggressive policies.  In this 
type of model, I assumed that CFC would show some degree of situational fluidity, in that 
experimental induction of anger could lead people to score lower on the scale (i.e., would show 
decreased consideration of the future) than they otherwise would.  Note that this position does 
not contradict the assumption that CFC can and does tap meaningful individual differences in 
time orientation. Rather, this merely assumes that any given measure can tap meaningful 
variability owing both to aspects of the person, as well as the situational context in which the 
scale is completed.  However, because the scale had not been used to measure temporary 
changes in CFC, there was some question whether or not it could do so effectively.  In order to 
maximize the CFC scale’s potential to capture fluctuations in state levels of the construct, the 
scale was moderately altered from its original form for the present study.  In the instructions, 
participants were told that they may have a particular preference on most days, but to make 
responses based on how they feel “right now in this moment”.  
CFC could also act as a moderator variable, insofar as the effect of the anger 
manipulation on support for militaristically aggressive policies could be moderated by the extent 
to which participants score relatively high or low on this scale.  For example, it could be that the 
tendency for anger to foster support for militaristically aggressive policies would be especially 
10 
 
pronounced for people who score low in CFC (i.e., are usually less concerned with future 
consequences in the first place).    
THE RISK HYPOTHESIS 
Another potential mechanism of the anger and war relationship involves two aspects of 
risk: perceptions of risk and willingness to make risky choices.  Before considering this 
hypothesis in any great detail, however, it is important for my purposes to make a distinction 
between risk perception as opposed to risk preference.  As will become clear presently, these are 
distinct facets of risk and were hypothesized to play their own role in explaining why anger 
might lead to systematic changes in war attitudes.   
Risk Perception 
In this dissertation, I define risk perception as an individual’s subjective belief that a 
particular positive or negative event will occur.  For example, let’s say two people, Jim and Bob, 
are both late to a job interview and that they are both considering driving over the speed limit in 
order to arrive in time.  Suppose further that Jim believes that there is a 1% chance that he will 
get a ticket, whereas Bob believes that the probability of getting a ticket is 30%.  In this case, the 
behavioral option (i.e., “should I speed?”) is identical for both persons, but they obviously differ 
in the perceived likelihood of a negative outcome (i.e., getting a ticket) if they were to engage in 
that behavior.  
Although there is no single, agreed-upon way of measuring perceived risk, the most 
common method of measuring this construct is to ask participants’ how likely certain life events 
are to occur (e.g., Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Lerner & Keltner, 2001).  For example, in this type 
of research paradigm participants are typically presented with a list of target outcomes or events 
(e.g., how likely it is that they will marry wealthy, the probability they will contract a sexually-
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transmitted disease, or the number of people who will be killed in the next year by a terrorist 
attack).  The logic employed here is that the perceived probability of an event occurring is the 
same as the perceived risk of occurrence.  As defined here, risk perception bears some 
resemblance to the concept of optimism.  Indeed, the technique used in the study by Lerner and 
Keltner (2001) involved an adaptation of a well-known measure of optimism developed by 
Weinstein (1980).  Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that, as employed here, the 
construct of risk perception is broadly defined as the subjective likelihood of negative as well as 
positive events
1
.  
Risk Preference 
Another important aspect of risk is risk preference. Here, the focus is on the degree to 
which the person is, or is not, likely to engage in a given risky behavior, holding perceived risk 
constant.  Returning to my earlier example, now suppose that Jim and Bob both hold identical 
beliefs about the probability of getting a ticket, and both believe that the chances are quite high 
(50%).  Suppose further that they also have identical perceptions with respect to all other 
relevant outcomes present in this situation (e.g., they hold identical beliefs about the likelihood 
of getting a job offer after the interview).  Even if one were to hold every single aspect of their 
beliefs constant, it still could be that Jim might be more likely to speed than Bob.  In this case, 
Jim and Bob differ in their apparent preference for risk, insofar as Bob appears to have a lower 
tolerance for engaging in behaviors that are associated with potentially serious and negative 
outcomes, even though he does not actually differ from Jim in terms of how likely those 
outcomes are considered to be.  In this case, one might loosely say that Bob is less of a “risk 
taker” than Jim, but a more precise way of rendering this difference is that these two individuals 
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differ in how they prefer to act in the context of risk, with all relevant aspects of their 
perceptions held constant.  
As used here, the concept of risk preference bears some resemblance to the constructs of 
risk aversion (vs. risk taking), as studied by Kahneman and Tversky in their line of work on 
prospect theory (1979).  In one of the more well-known paradigms employed in this literature, 
participants are asked to select among one of two potential choices after being explicitly 
informed of the relevant probabilities associated with each decisional optional.  For example, in 
the famous “Asian disease” problem, participants are told that if they choose treatment A, there 
is a 100% chance that 200 (out of 600) people will definitely live.  However, if they choose 
treatment B--the “riskier” of the two decisions--there is a 1/3 chance that everyone will live, but 
a 2/3 chance that everyone will die.  One of the interesting findings to emerge from this work is 
that seemingly trivial differences in the way that the problem is framed can lead people to have 
relatively greater preference for the risky choice, which is not normally seen as a viable option.    
For my purposes, however, the most important aspect of this research is that people are explicitly 
given the relevant probabilities associated with each decision and, as such, risk perception is held 
constant.  Nonetheless, as the research by Kahneman and Tversky shows, people can differ in 
their preferences for choosing to act in certain ways, even though the risk perceptions are held 
constant.  
The construct of risk preference (as opposed to risk perception) is also relevant to work in 
the personality area.  Early research in this area suggested a general link between extraversion 
(Eysenck, 1990) and risk, but more recent work suggests that preference for risky behaviors and 
choices may actually be driven by individual differences in sensation seeking, a dimension which 
is correlated with, but distinct from, extraversion (cf. Horvath & Zuckerman, 1993; Hoyle, 
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Fejfar, & Miller, 2000; Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000; Steinberg, Albert, Caufmann, Banich, 
Graham, & Woolard, 2008).  This raises the possibility of a dynamic interchange between risk 
preference and risk perception, which I discuss in more detail below.  
Risk Perception and Risk Preference in Real-Life Decisions 
 In most real-life decisions, people rarely know all of the relevant probabilities of their 
decisions (or potential decisions) ahead of time.  In such cases, there may be a fluid, dynamic 
interchange between risk perception and risk preference.  For example, a person who downplays 
the risks of skydiving (e.g., believe that the odds of a failed parachute are low) are probably more 
likely to prefer this sport compared to those who believe that these risks are high.  Or, the reverse 
may be true, insofar as preferences can drive perceptions.  For example, a person who (for 
whatever reason) loves to skydive may attempt to justify that lifestyle by arguing that the 
perceived risks of the sport are actually lower than is commonly believed.   
Nonetheless, although risk perception and risk preference may sometimes be related, they 
are clearly distinct and it is reasonable to suppose that that they are not always perfectly 
correlated.  An individual who is “risk-seeking” may very well perceive that a situation has a 
high probability of a negative outcome (e.g., “yeah, failed ‘chutes do happen all the time”), yet 
will still make the risky choice.  Conversely, an individual who is “risk-averse” may perceive 
that an act has a low probability of a negative outcome, but could still select the option with the 
least amount of risk.  Put another way, risk perception is looking at a situation and asking, “Are 
there risks?” Risk preference asks, “Should I act knowing the risks?” 
Anger and Risk 
 In the emotional appraisal literature, one often sees the claim that anger tends to promote 
“risky” decision making (Litvak, Lerner, Tiedens, & Shonk, 2010).  This position seems to 
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validate our intuitions, as angry people often appear to engage in behaviors that, from an outside 
perspective, seem rather inadvisable.  For example, people who are very angry often choose to 
retaliate against others in ways that run the risk of making the situation even worse, leading to an 
escalating cycle of negative outcomes.  One way of framing this sort of anger-driven riskiness is 
that the emotion of anger, by its very nature, tends to lead people to engage in actions that are 
intrinsically risky.   
These considerations raise a number of questions, however.  For one thing, what aspect 
of risk might be involved here?  Is it the case that anger produces a shift in preferences for risky 
behavior and decisions, leaving perceptions of risk unaffected?  Or, is it the case that anger 
affects risk perception, insofar as angry people are more “optimistic” than non-angry people, a 
state of affairs that ultimately leads them to engage in behaviors, and support decisions, that non-
angry people would tend to reject out of hand because of the perceived dangers associated with 
them?  Of course, anger could, in principle, be relevant to both aspects of risk, insofar as this 
emotion might simultaneously (a) lead people to view the future more optimistically (i.e., see 
positive outcomes as more likely, and negative outcomes as less likely) and also, (b) lead to a 
greater preference for risky choices, holding perceptions constant.  
What does the literature show with respect to these considerations?  It should be noted at 
the outset that the risk literature generally focuses on either risk perception or preference. It is far 
rarer for researchers to measure perceptions and preferences within a single line of research (for 
notable exceptions see Klein & Cerully, 2007; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995; and Sokolowska, 2006).  
Focusing more specifically on studies that have explored the role of anger, I am aware of only 
one article that has measured risk perception as well as risk preference, that by Lerner and 
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Keltner (2001).  This study is especially relevant to the current discussion and is therefore worth 
discussing in some detail.  
In Study 1 of Lerner and Keltner (2001), researchers found a positive correlation between 
trait anger and risk preference on the afore-mentioned Asian disease problem.  Specifically, 
anger was positively correlated with a tendency to prefer the more risky of the decisional 
alternatives.  Moreover, this study nicely separated the effects of anger (which was positively 
correlated with preference for risky decisions) from anxiety (which was correlated in the 
opposite direction).  To reiterate a point made above, use of the Asian disease problem provided 
valuable leverage that anger influenced risk preference, not perception, because all participants 
were simply told to accept the given probabilities as fact.  Note, however, that this study was 
nonexperimental and hence could not show the direct causal effect of anger on this sort of 
preference.  
The remaining studies (Studies 2-4) showed a relation between anger and risk 
perceptions. In particular, anger was shown to be associated with a pattern of “optimistic” risk 
perceptions, such that anger was associated with higher probabilities of positive outcomes, but 
lower probabilities of negative outcomes.  In other words, anger seemed to promote a general 
“rosiness” in thinking about the future.  Two of these studies (Studies 2 and 3) demonstrated this 
pattern using a nonexperimental design, whereas the final experiment (Study 4) demonstrated 
this effect using an experimental design, in which participants were randomly assigned to an 
anger vs. anxiety induction task.  This latter study showed greater optimism among participants 
assigned to the former compared to the latter condition.  Unfortunately, this study did not contain 
a control group.  A control group is critical in order to separate the effects of anger from anxiety 
and vice versa.  Stated differently, it is not clear whether the observed effects were mostly due to 
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the “optimistic” effects of anger, the “pessimistic” effects of anxiety, or whether both types of 
emotions were contributing.   
Summary and Potential Implications 
 To summarize, the available literature suggests that the emotion of anger is likely to lead 
people to adopt more pro-war attitudes than they might otherwise endorse.  Nevertheless, much 
of the available evidence in this regard is nonexperimental and, even for the research that has 
shown this effect using an experimental design (cf. Lambert et al., 2010), it is far from clear why, 
exactly, anger might have this effect.  As for risk, there is some evidence that anger can affect 
risk in at least two ways, both by leading to a systematic shift towards risky decision making 
(holding risk perceptions constant) but, also, in leading people to hold more optimistic views of 
the future.  As noted above, however, the available evidence is not completely definitive in this 
regard.  Setting aside these complexities, however, these considerations raise a provocative and 
empirically testable set of propositions regarding the role that risk might play in the relation 
between anger and pro-war attitudes.   
ANGER, RISK, AND ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR 
An essential point of the risk hypothesis is that differences in risk perception and risk 
preferences will affect the way individuals make judgments about engaging in war. In 
considering this possibility, it is important to note that I am assuming that war is an intrinsically 
“risky” enterprise, in the sense that any large-scale military campaign typically carries the 
possibility that there will be significant casualties associated with that war.  Of course, war is 
also associated with the potential for loss in a material sense, as waging a large scale war is 
inordinately expensive.  For example, the United States Congress has allocated over 1 trillion 
dollars for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001 (Reuters.com, 2010).  One could always 
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justify these potential losses in several different ways, either on moral grounds (e.g., “we must 
fight evil, no matter what the costs”), or on the grounds that victory is certain (e.g., “this will all 
be worth it at the end, once our enemy is defeated”).  However, the reality of war is that the 
eventual outcome is never known in advance and, as such, there is always the possibility that 
things could go disastrously wrong.  Nevertheless, despite these obvious risks, people can and 
often do support entry into war, and this seems especially true when people are angry.  This 
raises the possibility that the link between anger and war attitudes is determined in some way by 
changes in risk.  I describe these possibilities in a more formal way below. 
Hypothesis 1A (Mediation) 
One possibility is that the effect of anger (X) on war attitudes (Y) is mediated, in part, by 
changes in risk perception and/or risk preference (Z).  In one version of this meditational model, 
anger leads to a general shift towards optimism, such that angry people are generally likely to see 
positive outcomes as more likely, and negative outcomes as less likely.  Hence, when confronted 
with the prospect of a large-scale military invasion (e.g., the entry of the United States into war 
with North Korea), anger would tend to change the perceived risks of war, such that angry 
people would, compared to non-angry people, (a) believe that victory is more likely and that (b) 
the military involvement would entail fewer “losses” including those associated with loss of life.  
In other words, if the emotion of anger tends to breed general optimism, this fact alone might be 
responsible, in part, for the fact that angry people are more likely to support entry into war.  
Another possibility (not exclusive of the first) is that anger leads people to become more tolerant 
of the risks of war, holding perceptions constant.  In this view, anger leads people to have a 
greater preference for engaging in risky enterprises and, as such, paves the way for greater 
support for war, even though the actual risks associated with this attitudinal position remains 
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unchanged.  It is also possible that both risk perceptions and risk preferences would act as 
mediators at the same time, but independently from one another.     
Hypothesis 1B (Moderation) 
In addition to its possible role as a mediator, risk could also act as a moderator variable. 
In particular, even though risk can be affected by situational variables, there is ample evidence 
that risk perception and preferences have “trait-like” properties as well.  Thus, even if risk is not 
affected by anger, it could be that pre-existing differences in risk perception and/or risk 
preference determine the magnitude of the effect of anger on support for militaristically 
aggressive policies.  For example, the tendency for anger to foster support for militaristically 
aggressive policies could be especially prevalent among dispositionally optimistic risk 
perceivers.  Here, dispositional differences in risk perception could moderate the relation 
between anger and attitudes, such that the magnitude of this relation would be greater among 
people who are generally optimistic in their perception of risk.  In addition, it could also be that 
differences in risk preference could also moderate the relation between anger and attitudes, such 
that this relation would be stronger among people who have a chronically high preference for (or 
tolerance of) risk.  Additionally, it is possible both mediation and moderation effects could also 
occur simultaneously. 
THE COGNITIVE CONTROL HYPOTHESIS 
In the two preceding sections, I considered the possibility that anger might affect (a) how 
people think about the future (cf. the risk hypothesis), and/or (b) whether they are thinking about 
the future at all (cf. the time perspective hypothesis).  Here I consider a third and rather different 
possibility, that anger can more broadly affect the way that people process information.  In 
particular, I proposed that anger can lead to a general decrease in people’s tendency to process 
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information in an analytic manner, leading them to engage, instead, in more heuristic styles of 
decision making.  To anticipate the line of reasoning ahead, I suggest that anger leads people to 
latch on to rather simple rules of thumb (i.e., heuristics) which, in the context of a military 
conflict, could lead people to show more support for an emerging war than they otherwise 
would.  In the discussion to follow, I first provide a very brief summary of what is known about 
the determinants of processing style, that is, whether people process information in an analytic 
versus heuristic manner.  
Early studies of mood and processing style generally have tended to focus on the 
differential consequences of positive and negative affect.  Most of these studies concluded that 
negative affect caused individuals to process information in an analytical, detailed, and careful 
fashion (often labeled “systematic processing”) whereas positive affect caused individuals to 
process stimuli in a shallow manner, using less effort and less attention to detail (Clore, Schwarz, 
& Conway, 1994; Forgas, 1995).  This “heuristic-based” processing generally includes a reliance 
on pre-existing knowledge structures, peripheral cues, and cognitive shortcuts (e.g., stereotypes) 
for social judgments and decision-making.   
More recent research suggests, however, negative emotions do not inevitably lead to 
increased systematic processing.  In particular, although sadness does appear to induce greater 
reliance on systematic processing (Bless et al., 1990; Lambert, Khan, Lickel, & Fricke, 1997; 
Schwarz & Bless, 1991), anger produces an entirely different effect.  In particular, studies on 
anger suggest that it acts in a manner similar to other positive emotions (e.g., happiness) and 
causes individual to use a more shallow, heuristic-based processing style (Bodenhausen, 
Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Lerner et al., 1998; Tiedens & Linton, 2001; Small & Lerner, 2008).  
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How might these considerations be relevant to the link between anger and pro-war 
attitudes? For one thing, note that the reasons one could use to justify going to war immediately 
(e.g., they threatened us, we need to retaliate NOW!) are relatively simple and often have a knee-
jerk, tit-for-tat flavor.  In contrast, the reasons that are often given for not going to war typically 
involve more complex conditionalized processing (e.g., if we attack now, this could potentially 
make us more vulnerable to attack). Hence, other things being equal, a shift from analytic to 
heuristic processing might make it more likely that people generate pro, as opposed to anti, war 
attitudes.  A somewhat different way of framing this idea is that generation of anti-war attitudes 
may require some degree of inhibition of relatively “primitive” impulses, such as the desire to hit 
back when one is hit.  However, successful inhibition requires cognitive control (i.e., is an 
effortful, rather than automatic, process) and to this extent anger might tend to interfere with this 
inhibitory process, making it more likely that people respond impulsively in times of war (or 
impending war).  In either case, the central prediction here is that the emotion of anger might 
decrease cognitive control and produce greater reliance on heuristic, compared to controlled, 
processing. This shift could, in and of itself, promote a greater acceptance of pro-war attitudes 
for the reasons noted above.   
A Brief Note on Motivation vs. Ability  
The aforementioned discussion raises the question of why, exactly, anger promotes a less 
systematic (i.e., more heuristic-based) style of processing.  This issue is not critically important 
for present purposes, but does merit brief explanation here.  One possibility, stemming from the 
mood as information literature (Schwarz, 1990) is that anger essentially acts as an “act now, 
think later!” cue, prompting people to engage in well-learned behaviors that do not require a 
great deal of cognitive thought.  Put somewhat bluntly, anger is a fairly “primitive” emotion that 
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is associated with relatively simple action tendencies (fighting back) and hence, the experience 
of anger might be sufficient to trigger simple (heuristic) rather than analytic modes of thought.  
Similarly, from an evolutionary perspective, anger may signal a dangerous/threatening 
environment.  In order to survive the immediate situation, action must be taken rapidly.  The 
need for an immediate response would most certainly require the use of a heuristic processing 
strategy.  Note that this explanation is a motivational account of anger, in that anger decreases 
people’s motivation to engage in controlled, systematic processing. 
A somewhat different explanation derives from the idea that the experience of the 
emotion itself, and/or the cognitions associated with it, can act as a kind of cognitive load, 
preventing people from engaging in careful, systematic processing of information (Lambert et 
al., 1997; Schwarz, 1990).  Note that this is an ability-based, not motivational, account.  
According to this account, even if people wanted to process information carefully while they 
were angry, they would (to varying degrees, depending on the intensity of anger) be impaired in 
their ability to do so.    
For purposes of the present studies, however, it was not especially critical whether the 
link between anger and processing style is due to changes in motivation or ability.  What is most 
important is that the experimental induction of anger should lead to a reduction in cognitive 
control, leading participants, in turn, to rely to a greater extent on heuristic-based processing.  
For reasons noted above, this shift in processing style could, in and of itself, foster a greater 
likelihood of people formulating pro-war attitudes. Fortunately, there are several well-established 
techniques for measuring cognitive control, including a relatively simple technique recently 
employed by Payne (2005), which I describe in more detail in the methodology section.   
Mediation vs. Moderation 
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 Similar to the two proceeding hypotheses, the critical variable (here, cognitive capacity) 
could play a role as a mediator, as well as a moderator.  In this particular case, I was most 
confident in making predictions for mediation, given the evidence pointing to the deleterious 
effects of anger on cognitive control.  This meditational model can be formally stated as the 
possibility that the effect of anger (X) on support for war (Y) could be mediated, in part, by 
changes in people’s cognitive control (Z), the latter measure to be assessed via a general measure 
of control (Payne, 2005).  It is also conceivable that cognitive control could act as a moderator.  
Here, as in the previous two hypotheses, there could be individual differences in cognitive 
control. To this extent, it seems reasonable to suppose that people who exhibit chronically low 
levels of cognitive control might be more likely to show evidence of the effects of anger on 
support for militaristically aggressive policies.  Stated differently, it could be that the 
combination of experimentally induced anger coupled with chronically low levels of cognitive 
control could lead to relatively high levels of support for military conflicts.   
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES 
One way of thinking about these topics is that I am proposing that anger could affect 
cognition in two key ways.  In particular, anger could affect (a) what people are thinking about 
as well as (b) how people are thinking.  The first two hypotheses--changes in time perspective 
and risk perception/preference--are examples of changes in what people are thinking about.  That 
is, anger may affect whether people are thinking about the future or not (cf. Experiment 1) as 
well as whether they are, or are not, considering the relevant presence of risks (cf. Experiment 2).   
However, anger could also affect how people are thinking about these issues, namely, the extent 
to which these thoughts are dominated by controlled vs. automatic processes (cf. Experiment 3).  
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Figures 1A and 1B provide a schematic summary of the preceding hypotheses. As seen in 
the top figure (1A), my research assessed the validity of three distinct meditational mechanisms 
that could, in theory, account for the effects of anger on pro-war attitudes.  In each case, I 
employed suitable measures of each of the three key constructs (time perspective, risk, cognitive 
control) and used standard statistical techniques to assess mediation.  In this case, differences 
with respect to these three variables could moderate the extent to which the experimental 
manipulation exerts an influence on the dependent variable.  This possibility is schematically 
illustrated in Figure 1B.  
 As implied by the preceding section, my primary focus was on mediation, mostly because 
the predictions derived from the literature were more relevant to mediation, rather than 
moderation.  However, it should be emphasized that moderation is no less “important” than 
mediation and that support for one or more models of moderation is likely to offer as much 
insight into the present considerations as would models of mediation.  Of course, as mentioned 
previously, it is also possible that both mediation and moderation could occur.   
 OVERVIEW OF EXPERIMENTS  
In all three experiments, all participants first completed a battery of individual difference 
measures, including standard measures of political ideology, trait anger, and trait aggression.  
Following these measures, participants were randomly assigned to either the anger or the neutral 
mood manipulation. At the end of all three experiments participants were presented with a 
hypothetical war scenario and asked to evaluate their support for war and perceived risks of the 
war.  The key difference between the three experiments was which of the hypothesized 
mediators of the anger--war attitudes relationship were measured. 
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In theory, it might be possible to conduct a single experiment in which all relevant tests 
of mediation/moderation involving all three of the relevant intervening variables (time 
perspective, risk, and cognitive control) were conducted in the context of a single study.  
However, a valid concern was that if participants are spending a significant amount of 
time and effort on the meditational measurement tasks, this could counteract the effect of the 
mood induction.  If their experimentally induced moods drop back to baseline, then we would be 
unable to see the emotion’s effects on the main dependent variable, attitudes towards war. 
To avoid this possible problem, each proposed mechanism was measured in separate 
experiments.  Experiment 1 involved an experimental manipulation of anger (vs. control) and 
included a measure of consideration of future consequences. Experiment 2 was the same as 
Experiment 1, but instead of measuring CFC, participants completed measures of risk perception 
and preference.  Experiment 3 was the same as Experiments 1 and 2 except for the use of a 
measure of cognitive control. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
METHOD 
Participants and Design 
A total of 116 college undergraduates (54 male, 62 female) participated in this study for 
partial completion of course credit or payment of ten dollars. The design consisted of one 
between-subjects factor, involving random assignment to the justice violation versus neutral 
mood condition. Preliminary analyses of the data revealed seven participants with outlier scores 
on key dependent variables (in all cases, +2.75 SDs above or below the mean), including (a) five 
participants who had extreme responses on the anger/war attitude tasks and (b) two participants 
who selected the lowest possible option when asked to rate how much effort they put into the 
experiment as a whole. The 2.75 SD cut-off is based on the identification of two particular cases 
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that were apart from the distribution. This cut-off allowed for these two participants to be 
removed from analysis. Two additional participants were excluded, one for not following 
directions, and another for demonstrating a high level of suspiciousness on the experiment. After 
these exclusions, a total of 107 participants were retained in the formal analyses, 51 in the 
experimental condition and 56 in the control condition. (When the aforementioned participants 
were not excluded, analyses revealed a pattern that was very similar to, but somewhat weaker 
than, the results reported ahead.)      
 Schematic Overview of Design 
 Because of the complexity of the design and multitude of measures pertaining to different 
theoretical issues, some readers may wish to consult a schematic summary of the various 
measures and tasks to be described in more detail ahead. This summary is presented in Figure 2.  
Assessment of Individual Differences 
Upon arriving at the laboratory, participants were escorted to separate cubicles. 
Participants first completed a battery of individual difference questionnaires, briefly summarized 
below.  (For the sake of expositional clarity, I do not list all of the items in each individual 
difference variable in the discussion to follow; see Appendix A for a complete list of all items in 
each scale.)   
Trait anger/aggression. The first two set of scales assessed chronic (trait-based) 
measures of aggression or anger. The first of these was Spielberger’s (1985) 13-item trait-anger 
scale.  This scale contained items such as “I am a hotheaded person” and “I have a fiery temper” 
while using a Likert response scale of 1 (almost never) to 9 (almost always). Two items that are 
normally used in this scale were not included because they were state rather than trait measures 
of anger (“I feel irritated; I feel angry”). A composite index of trait anger was formed on the 
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basis of an average of all 13 items (alpha = .83). Participants next completed Buss and Perry’s 
(1992) trait aggression scale, in which participants were asked to respond to 14 items along a 
scale ranging from 1 (extremely uncharacteristic of me) to 9 (extremely characteristic of me). An 
average of these items yielded an overall index of trait aggression (alpha = .84). As one might 
expect, the aforementioned measure of trait anger was significantly correlated with scores on this 
index of trait aggression (r = .54, p < .001). However, I included both measures in light of 
previous theory and research suggesting that trait anger and trait aggression are correlated, but 
theoretically distinct, constructs. See Table 1 for the means and standard deviations of constructs 
in Experiments 1 – 3.  
Sensation seeking. Next, participants completed Hoyle, Stephenson, Palmgreen, Lorch, 
and Donohew’s (2002) Brief Sensation Seeking Scale (BSSS). As noted in the introduction, 
sensation seeking is a personality variable related to risk-taking. Research also suggests that 
sensation seeking may be associated with a tendency to not think about the future (i.e. be focused 
on the present; Joireman, Anderson, & Strathman, 2003). The BSSS employed a Likert-type 
scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree); a composite measure was formed on the 
basis of all 8 items in the scale (alpha = .82).  
Political attitudes.  Participants then completed a series of scales to assess their pre-
existing political attitudes. They first completed a 12-item measure of political orientation. Each 
participant’s favorability towards liberalism and conservatism was assessed by presenting the 
two statements “I consider myself to be politically liberal (conservative)” with a response scale 
of 1 (very much disagree) to 9 (very much agree) for both (Conover & Feldman, 1981). These 
types of ideology measures have been a strong predictor of voting behavior and a wide variety of 
political attitudes (Jost, 2006). In the political science and political psychology literature, 
27 
 
political orientation is usually divided into two dimensions: Economic and Moral ideology 
(Feldman, 2003). Therefore, in addition to the two broad items of political orientation described 
above, participants also responded to four questions regarding their views towards political 
economics (“The U.S. government already spends too much giving money to the poor”) and three 
items on political morality (“I support full legalization of homosexual marriage”). Recent 
research has also indicated a third dimension called “tough-mindedness” which consists of 
political attitudes towards militarism, crime, and immigration (Young, 2009). Three items were 
included to assess trait attitudes towards this dimension (“The death penalty should be eliminated 
from the American Justice System”). These political orientation measures consisted of a total of 
12 items and were averaged for a reliability alpha of .72. 
 Participants next completed measures of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto, 
Sidanius, Stallworth & Male, 1994) and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1988).  
These are by far two of the most common political attitude measures used in the literature 
presently. SDO is an attitudinal orientation regarding intergroup relations. More specifically, 
SDO measures whether one generally prefers group relations to be hierarchical rather than equal.  
Scale items include, “To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups” and 
“All groups should be given an equal chance in life”.  RWA is a personality variable containing 
three main factors: conventionalism, aggression towards outgroups, and submission to 
authorities. Items on the RWA scale include “The established authorities generally turn out to be 
right about things, while the radicals and protestors are usually just "loud mouths" showing off 
their ignorance”.  Participants completed a shortened version of the RWA scale to limit the 
reduction in participants’ attentional abilities that may occur during the experiment. Both 
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measures used a response scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). Both indices had 
excellent reliabilities (SDO, α = .91; RWA, α = .88).  
Assessment of Baseline Mood 
In addition to the aforementioned individual difference variables, mood was also assessed 
before the mood manipulation. The purpose of this task was to provide an initial “baseline” level 
of mood. This was accomplished using a modified Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) 
(Watson & Tellegen, 1988).  (The modification in question simply reflects the fact that I 
included a wider range of mood queries than is typically included on the PANAS.)  In this task, 
participants were presented with adjectives describing a particular mood (e.g., angry, pleased). 
For each of the mood adjectives participants were asked to rate the extent to which they felt that 
affective state at that moment, along a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much so). The 
full set of adjectives included the following 25 randomly presented adjectives: interested, bored, 
edgy, happy, alert, irritated, satisfied, mad, upset, tense, sad, pleased, relaxed, unhappy, angry, 
determined, irate, dejected, anxious, comfortable, jittery, nervous, worried, confident, calm.   
Correlation Among Individual Difference Variables 
 It is useful to provide a preliminary indication of how all of the various individual 
difference variables were related to one another. As seen in Table 2, the three political measures 
(Political Orientation, SDO, RWA) all correlated with each other significantly. Interestingly, 
sensation seeking was positively related to trait aggression, but was non-significantly negatively 
associated with trait anger. Of the political ideology measures, only social dominance was 
significantly related to trait aggression at the .05 alpha level. However, both SDO and RWA (but 
not Political Orientation) were significantly related to Trait Anger.  
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 Baseline state emotions were strongly correlated with one another. Not surprisingly, the 
baseline state anger, anxiety, and sadness were all related to trait anger. The state emotion 
baseline measures did not correlate with any of the other individual difference variables with the 
exception of baseline anger with trait aggression and RWA. 
Mood Manipulation and Measurement 
After completion of the pre-measures, mood was manipulated using a procedure adapted 
from a widely-used method initially developed by Strack and his colleagues (Strack, Schwarz, & 
Gschneidinger, 1985; see also Lambert et al. 1997; 2010).  Half of the participants were randomly 
assigned to an anger induction condition. This induction consisted of two sections. In the first 
section, participants were asked to “think about an event in your life in which you were treated 
extremely unfairly. In your response, describe what actually happened in as much vivid detail as 
you can”. Participants were given a blank space (taking up approximately three fourths of one page) 
to write their response. On the next page, participants were given the following additional 
instructions: “Now we would like you to focus more specifically on how this event makes you feel. 
Please include any and all aspects of your own internal reactions, including thoughts, emotions, as 
well as any physiological changes (e.g., changes in heart rate).  Please focus both on (a) how the 
event made you feel at the time the event initially occurred as well as (b) how this event makes you 
feel right now”. As in the first part, participants were given a blank space, consisting of three 
fourths of a page, to write their response.  Completion of this task generally took between 10 and 15 
minutes. 
 The other half of the participants were assigned to a neutral mood condition (or, more 
precisely, a non-manipulated/baseline, mood condition). In this group, participants were asked to 
write about the mundane details of an average day in their life. This task took about the same 
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amount of time as the angry mood induction, i.e. approximately 10-15 minutes. Following the mood 
manipulation task, all participants returned to the computer and completed the same PANAS task 
that had been given as a pre measure.   
Formation of Mood Composites 
Composites of specific emotions were created based on principal components analysis. The 
index of anger was created using the items mad, angry, irate, upset (α = .93). In addition, I also 
formed a composite index of anxiety (anxious, fearful, worried nervous; α = .86), and sadness (sad, 
unhappy; α = .81).  Two parallel sets of composites were formed, one for the baseline measure and 
another for the assessment of mood immediately after the experimental manipulation.  The 
composition of each index was the same in both cases.  For example, the four specific items that 
were used to construct the baseline measure of anger were the same as those used to construct the 
post-manipulation index of anger.  As one might expect given their identical composition and 
administration within a short period of time, each of the pairings of mood indices (e.g. pre vs. post-
measures of anger) were strongly correlated with one another.  The intercorrelations between the 
post manipulation mood indices are presented in Table 3.  
Assessment of Consideration of Future Consequences 
As described in the introduction, temporal orientation was operationalized in terms of the 
12-item Consideration of Future Consequences scale (Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, & 
Edwards, 1994). The CFC scale contained response options of 1 (not at all how I feel right now) 
to 9 (very much how I feel right now). This scale was slightly altered from its original form so 
that it was clear to readers that responses should indicate current feelings towards the items, not 
their global consideration of the future and its consequences. An average of all items was used 
for the CFC index (alpha = .86).  
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 Because of the central importance of the CFC scale to this study, it is useful to elaborate 
on its role in the analyses to follow. As I noted in the introduction, an overarching objective of 
the present research was to gain greater insight into “intervening” variables that might help to 
explain the link between anger and changes in war attitudes. In this study, temporal orientation, 
as measured by the CFC scale, could actually play two distinct roles.  
 First, it is possible that CFC could act as a mediator, whereby the effect of the 
experimental manipulation on war attitudes could be due, in part, to changes in temporal 
orientation. (Note that the meditational role of CFC would likely arise in combination with 
changes in mood. Hence, technically, this would involve a “double mediation” involving 
changes not only in angry mood, but temporal orientation as well.) Second, CFC could also act 
as a moderator, in addition to any role it might play as a mediator. In this latter case, the effects 
of the experimental manipulation on key dependent variables could depend on whether 
participants score high or low on CFC. Although the combination of mediation and moderation 
in the same study can sometimes be complex, the present data provided a fairly clear delineation 
of these two “roles” of CFC.   
War Passage 
After completing the CFC scale on the computer, all participants were instructed to return 
to the paper packet used previously for the mood manipulation. There, they were given 
instructions to read a passage about a hypothetical military conflict involving the United States 
of America, South Korea, and North Korea. They were told that although the current situation 
was NOT actually happening, they should read it as if it did in fact reflect the current state of 
affairs in the world today. They were asked to think about the implications of such a situation 
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and what actions they believe the United States should take going forward. Participants were 
given the following passage: 
Washington DC. (UPDATED 5:20 pm).  In a series of fast-moving events today, the 
President and the U.S. Congress agreed to further talks in light of the serious situation 
quickly developing involving North Korea.  Senior Pentagon officials confirm that these 
options include the use of military force. The current situation has escalated dramatically 
over the past three weeks, and is centered on four key events.  All four of these events 
involve North Korea engaging in acts of aggression against the United States and South 
Korea, one of the U.S’s strongest allies in the region. 
 
Although North Korea has threatened the United States and much of Western Europe the 
past months, the situation turned deadly when the American embassy in Thailand was 
bombed, causing the deaths of nearly 15 people, most of which were American citizens.  
All evidence provided by the C.I.A. suggests North Korean militants were responsible for 
the attack. Following this attack, five Americans were kidnapped from the American 
embassy in Japan and are currently being held hostage in Pyongyang, North Korea.  Last 
week, the U.S. shot down two North Korean spy planes flying into American air space. 
Two days after the spy planes were shot down, 25 alleged North Korean spies were 
arrested in and around Washington D.C. and New York City. Reports from senior 
government officials indicate the captured spies had been conducting surveillance of 
important U.S. sites including the Pentagon and the Capital building. The alleged spies 
were caught with thousands of pictures and videos of the sites, as well as massive 
amounts of bomb making materials. U.S. officials believe they were part of a large 
network of North Korean militants plotting within the United States and believe more are 
still at large in the U.S. During this time, the North Koreans have continued nuclear 
weapon testing extending far into the pacific within 500 miles of Hawaii. The North 
Korean government has denied all allegations of involvement with these events. North 
Korean officials argue they cannot control the actions of a few rogue militants. 
 
Officials believe North Korea’s actions stem from their frustration over recent sanctions 
placed on the country by the United Nations. These sanctions were pushed heavily by the 
U.S. and South Korea. The U.S. argued for these sanctions due to North Korea’s refusal 
to end their nuclear weapons program. In recent days both the United States and North 
Korea have attempted to display their military might. The U.S. sent a fleet of ships and 
submarines off the coasts of North and South Korea, North Korea has responded by 
conducting tests of their long-range missiles and other nuclear devices. 
 
Beyond the United States’ hostilities towards North Korea, reports suggest that the 
situation is even more serious in South Korea. Both South and North Korea have been 
verbally fighting over many issues in the past.  However, since the U.N. sanctions were 
imposed, North Korea has called up their military and has amassed hundreds of 
thousands of troops on the border between North and South Korea. American military 
experts believe North Korea’s military build-up is consistent with preparations for a 
massive invasion of South Korea. These same experts are especially concerned due to the 
fact North Korea has the 4
th
 largest standing army in the world. Despite diplomatic efforts 
by numerous countries to convince North Korea to remove their troops from the border, 
North Korea has only increased their military build-up.  Reports indicate that most 
intelligence agencies around the world, including the C.I.A, believe an invasion of South 
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Korea by North Korea is imminent.  Due to the recent attacks on the United States and 
the strong possibility of the invasion of South Korea, the U.S. government is currently 
contemplating how to respond. 
 
 
 After reading the passage, participants were given space to write down their thoughts 
about the passage on the following page of the packet. The goal of this section was for 
participants to consolidate and more fully develop their opinions of the content of the passage by 
writing out their current feelings. In this section, participants were asked a series of questions 
regarding their evaluations of the scenario they just read. They were first asked, “What are your 
overall feelings towards the situation?”. After a section of writing space, participants were 
prompted with the following questions: “What do you think the United States should do in this 
situation? Please explain why you feel the U.S. should act in the way you described. Please be as 
detailed as possible.” Participants were again given space on the page to write their response.  
Assessment of War Attitudes 
 Upon finishing the writing task, participants were instructed to return to the computer for 
additional questions. Here, participants were asked a series of questions about the war passage. 
One section, which served as the main dependent variable for this study, pertained to whether 
participants believed the United States should engage in a military conflict with North Korea. 
Based on the results of principal components analyses, an average of the following items was 
used to construct an index of attitudes towards the possibility of U.S. military action against 
North Korea: Under these circumstances, the United States should immediately begin bombing 
North Korea; America would be completely justified in attacking North Korea; America should 
not go to war with North Korea, more diplomacy should be used to resolve the situation; It 
would be a huge mistake for the United States to attack North Korea; The United States should 
invade North Korea; The United States should begin to move soldiers into S. Korea in order to 
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advance into North Korea; Under the current circumstances, I do not support going to war with 
North Korea; The United States will look weak if they do not engage militarily with North Korea. 
Reliability for this construct was excellent (alpha = .91).  
Perceived War Risk 
 Participants also received a separate section measuring their subjective likelihood 
estimates of possible outcomes that could occur if the United States were to attack North Korea 
within the contexts of the hypothetical situation presented in the passage. This included items 
such as, “If the United States were to attack North Korea, there would be a high probability that 
the U.S. would meet its objectives”. The purpose of this measure was to assess participants’ 
beliefs regarding the perceived risk involved for the United States if it were to go to war with 
North Korea. Someone agreeing strongly to the item listed above would presumably perceive 
little risk in going to war because he or she believes a positive outcome will occur. The reliability 
alpha for this construct was .67. Participants responded on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly 
agree) scale for both of the war measures
2
.  
Assessment of Demographics 
Following the war measures, I collected demographic information from each participant.  
Participants were asked to provide their gender, age, citizenship, and ethnicity, as well as other 
related factors.  Participants who replied “Asian” to the ethnicity question, were asked to specify 
which Asian country(ies) they themselves are originally from, or descend from. (These more 
precise questions of Asian ethnicity were deemed necessary because ethnicities of certain Asian 
countries could have differentially affected attitudes towards the hypothetical war passage, 
because it directly involved specific Asian countries.) After this section of demographics, 
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participants were asked how easy the war scenario was to imagine, how interesting the article 
was to them, and the amount of effort they gave on the task.  
Summary of Methodology 
To summarize, all participants began the experiment by completing a series of individual 
differences measures and an assessment of their state mood. Participants were randomly assigned 
to either the justice violation condition or the control condition and completed the subsequent 
writing task. Next, all participants completed an additional mood assessment task. This was 
followed by completing the consideration of future consequences scale and presentation of the 
United States vs. North Korea military conflict passage. Participants then completed the war 
attitudes and war risk measures. Lastly participants completed a series of demographic items and 
a self-report of their effort on the task.  
Brief Summary of Predictions  
I have already discussed the predictions for this experiment along with the theoretical 
assumptions on which these predictions are based.  Nevertheless, it is useful to briefly reiterate 
the main predictions before presenting the main findings, ahead.  To begin, I predicted that 
participants would show more favorable (“hawkish”) views towards military engagement with N. 
Korea if they had been assigned to the anger induction condition than if they were not. Anger 
was expected to play a key mediator role in this effect, such that the effect of the anger induction 
on these attitudes should be due to changes in angry mood. However, I predicted that changes in 
temporal orientation (as assessed by scores on the CFC scale) could also play a meditational role, 
over and above whatever meditational role angry mood might play. I also considered the 
possibility that temporal orientation could also act as a moderator, such that the positive effect of 
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the anger manipulation on war attitudes would be stronger among participants scoring low in 
CFC (i.e. those who score low in future orientation) rather than those who score high.  
RESULTS 
Effects of the Experimental Manipulation on Anger 
 As predicted, participants in the justice violation condition expressed significantly higher 
ratings of anger compared to those in the control condition (Ms = 3.34 vs. 1.74), F(1, 106) = 
31.24, p < .001, ηp
2
= .23. This effect demonstrates that the justice violation manipulation had an 
effect on emotions, albeit a small effect. This effect was not moderated by gender F(1, 105) = 
1.11, p > .25, nor by political orientation, F(1, 105) = 0.87, p > .25. 
 In addition to anger (the focal emotion in this paper), analyses revealed two additional 
effects, both of which were smaller (in statistical magnitude) than the effect involving anger.  In 
particular, there was an effect involving anxiety such that scores were higher in the experimental 
condition compared to control (Ms = 2.88 vs. 2.28), F(1, 106) = 4.99, p < .05, ηp
2
= .05. In 
addition, participants reported higher levels of sadness in the former condition compared to the 
latter (Ms = 3.18 vs. 2.25), F(1, 106) = 10.05, p < .01, ηp
2
= .09. I believe these effects can be 
seen as a side effect of the anger manipulation.  
 One way of demonstrating the “dominant” role of anger is to show that the effects of my 
manipulation on anger remained significant, even after controlling for its shared variance with 
the other mood indices
2
.  In particular, the main effect of the experimental manipulation on the 
angry mood index remained significant even after controlling for anxiety (Ms = 3.24 vs. 1.83), 
F(1,103) = 25.17, p < .001 
 ηp
2
= .20. However, the effects of this manipulation on anxiety 
disappeared after statistically controlling for anger (Ms = 2.64 vs 2.49), F(1,103) = .28, p > .25.  
Similarly, the effect of the experimental manipulation on sadness was no longer significant after 
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controlling for anger (Ms = 2.61 vs. 2.76), F(1,103) = .35, p > .25. In sum, even after controlling 
for its shared variance with the other negative emotions, the experimental manipulation exerted a 
significant effect on anger.  However, the reverse was not true, as the effects of the manipulation 
on the other negative emotions tended to be attenuated, or disappear altogether, once I controlled 
for anger.  
Primary Analyses 
 One of the first issues to arise in these analyses is whether the experimental manipulation 
(justice vs. control) had a direct or indirect effect on (a) consideration of future consequences 
(hereinafter, CFC) and participants’ attitudes towards war (hereinafter, war attitudes). (For the 
sake of expositional brevity, I refer to the experimental condition as the “anger induction” 
condition, with the understanding that this manipulation actually involved a reminder of a 
personal event involving injustice.)  A direct effect was tested using a one-way ANOVA, with 
the null hypothesis stating there was no difference between conditions on the CFC scale or the 
war attitudes scale. Neither of these analyses provided a hint of a direct effect. In particular, 
scores on the CFC were nearly identical, regardless of whether participants were in the anger 
induction condition or the control condition (Ms = 5.99 vs. 6.14), F(1, 107) = .38, p > .25. 
Similarly, scores on war attitudes did not differ as a function of condition (Ms = 3.50 vs. 3.66), 
F(1, 107) = .27, p > .25.  Hence, CFC could not serve as a mediator in the conventional sense of 
that term (Baron & Kenny, 1986) because the experimental manipulation did not produce any 
changes in this variable in the first place. Analysis also revealed that neither CFC nor any other 
variable acted as a moderator of the Condition – War attitudes association. Thus, the potential 
moderation effect displayed in Figure 1B was not significant for any variable of interest. 
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However, there were a number of moderators of the Anger – War attitudes relationship. These 
effects are described below.  
 Hierarchical regression analyses revealed a marginally significant positive relationship 
between Anger and War attitudes (Beta = .23, p = .09) indicating a tendency for higher levels of 
angry mood to be associated with greater support for war. All regression analyses and tests for 
moderation in all three experiments were conducted controlling for the variables of condition and 
the baseline measure of anger, including the moderator analyses discussed below.  In addition to 
the moderating effects of CFC (which we shall consider presently), initial analyses revealed 
several meaningful moderator effects of the anger – war attitudes association in their own right, 
including those related to (a) gender, with the anger-war effect stronger for males compared to 
females, (b) political ideology, with this relationship stronger for conservatives compared to 
liberals, and (c) trait aggression, with the anger-war attitudes link stronger for participants 
scoring high in trait aggression.  Each of these analysis were conducted with only the moderator 
of interest included, and did not include the other interaction effects. Details pertaining to each of 
these moderator effects are provided below. 
Moderator Effect #1: Gender 
 Analyses of war attitudes revealed an angry mood by gender interaction, B = - .33, p < 
.001
4
. This interaction was clearly due to the fact that the relationship between anger and war 
attitudes was strong for the male participants (B = .63, p < .01) whereas this relationship showed, 
if anything, a small trend in the opposite direction for females (B = -.09, p > .25). The nature of 
this interaction is displayed in Figure 3.  
Moderator Effect #2: Political Ideology 
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 In addition to gender, the positive relationship between anger and war attitudes was also 
moderated by the continuous variable of political orientation (B = .18, p < .05).  Using the 
procedure suggested by Aiken and West (1991), I explored the nature of this effect by centering 
all predictor variables and computing the relationship between anger and war attitudes for 
participants 1 SD above, as well as 1 SD below the mean for political orientation. The relatively 
more politically conservative participants in this sample had a strong positive Anger – War 
support relationship (B =.43, p = .01).  In contrast, the more liberal participants did not show this 
effect (B = .05, p > .25). This finding is also consistent with the fact that conservatives tend to be 
more “hawkish” in their evaluations of war.  Figure 4 provides a graphical illustration of this 
interaction. 
Moderator Effect #3:  Trait Aggression 
 Pre-existing levels of trait aggression also moderated the anger and war attitudes 
relationship (B = .15, p < .05). As seen in Figure 5, participants high in trait aggression revealed 
a significant, positive relation between angry mood and support for war, (B = .41, p < .05). In 
contrast, those who scored low on trait aggression did not show any hint of an anger – war 
relationship (B = .08, p > .25). 
Moderator Effect #4:  CFC 
 Initial analyses revealed a significant CFC x Anger interaction when treating war 
attitudes as the criterion variable, (B = -.19, p < .05). Participants scoring low (1 SD below the 
mean) on CFC (indicating a tendency to not think about the future) displayed a significant 
Anger-War relationship (B = .42, p < .01).  In contrast, those at high levels (1 SD above the 
mean) of the CFC scale (i.e. participants who did, in fact, have a future orientation) did not 
display an association between Anger and War (B = -.04, p > .25). The nature of this relationship 
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is shown in Figure 6.  As seen in this figure, participants who were thinking more about 
immediate consequences of military action tended to support war more as they became angrier.  
 
Summary of Moderator Effects 
 As seen in the preceding sections, analysis revealed four moderators of the anger – war 
relationship: gender, trait aggression, political orientation, and CFC.  That is, the tendency for 
anger to be related to war attitudes was contingent on four conceptually distinct variables. 
Nevertheless, this raises an important question: Is it really the case that these analyses reflect the 
operation of four distinct moderator effects?  This sort of question is especially important to ask 
whenever the moderator variables in question are correlated with one another.   
 As seen in Table 4, there were, in fact, some reliable relationships between some of the 
moderator variables. This included a contingency of political ideology and trait aggression on 
gender, such that males tended to score high in conservatism and also scored high in trait 
aggression.  As it turns out, however, conclusions are the same, even after taking into account 
this overlap.  In particular, I again tested for each of these moderator effects while controlling for 
the other three moderator effects.  (For example, when testing for the moderating effects of 
political ideology on the relationship between anger and war attitudes, I statistically controlled 
for gender, CFC, and trait aggression).  This analytic approach yielded very similar conclusions, 
as these analyses again yielded clear evidence for each of the four moderator effects in question. 
 A more formal analysis of the independence of the interaction effects is to include all 
four interactions in the model simultaneously. This analysis revealed that only the gender by 
anger interaction remained significant B = -.25, p < .05.  Thus these interaction effects are 
partially due to the role of the gender interaction effect. However, this finding does not mean that 
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the other three moderates (CFC, political ideology, and trait aggression) are not important and 
meaningful in their own right. Although it is clear that gender is key to understanding these 
interaction effects, the individual moderators are important for understanding the anger-war 
support relationship.  
Mediation of Anger-War Support 
 Although CFC’s role as a moderator is consequential in its own right, an important 
purpose of this experiment was to test CFC as a mediator of the association between anger and 
war attitudes. As stated previously, because the main independent variable in this study 
(experimental condition) was not related to the dependent variable, classic mediational analyses 
following recommendations from Baron and Kenny (1986) were not possible. However, recent 
research on variable mediation demonstrates that indirect effects can still be theoretically 
meaningful and important even without meeting the preconditions stipulated by Baron and 
Kenny. Specifically, a significant “total effect” in which the main dependent variable (in this 
case, war support) is regressed upon the independent variable (condition) is not necessary to 
interpret meaningful indirect effects (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007; Rucker, Preacher, 
Tormala, & Petty, 2011).  In this particular case, I was interested in testing whether the effect of 
the experimental manipulation on war attitudes was mediated in serial fashion, first by anger, and 
then by CFC.  (schematically, experimental manipulation  anger (M1)  CFC (M2)  
war attitudes). As with any other test of mediation, the viability of this process depends, of 
course, on the presence of reliable relationships at each step of the proposed pathway.  Prior to 
formal tests of mediation, therefore, it is useful to first determine if such relationships do, in fact, 
exist.   
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 The nature of these relationships is shown in Figure 7. All analyses were conducted 
controlling for condition and baseline anger in each step.  One aspect of this figure, the 
significant relationship between the experimental manipulation and anger (Beta = .43, p < .001), 
simply confirms the implications of the preceding analyses.  However, there was not a significant 
relationship between anger and CFC, (Beta = -.08, p > .25), even though there was a negative 
relationship between CFC and war attitudes (Beta = -.20, p < .05). This CFC – War attitudes 
relationship holds when including all prior variables (pre-measure of anger, post measure of 
anger and condition) in the model as predictors. Because each pathway is not significant, CFC 
does not appear to be a mediator of the Anger – War relationship using this full data set.   
 Separate Mediational Analyses for Males and Females 
 My primary analyses showed that males were displaying a stronger relationship between 
anger and attitudes toward war. Hence, it seemed prudent to test for the possibility of mediation 
for each gender group separately. 
 Male participants only.   As seen in Figure 8, condition again had a strong effect on 
reported anger (Beta = .36, p < .001). Next, anger and CFC were only marginally significantly 
related (Beta = -.43, p = .06). Interestingly, CFC and war attitudes were significantly associated 
with one another (Beta = -.30, p < .05). Analyses also revealed a significant relationship between 
anger and war support (Beta = .63, p < .01) for this male-only data set.  Most important, formal 
tests of mediation using Hayes’ (in press) PROCESS bootstrapping procedure did not actually 
yield significant support for the proposed multiple mediation. The confidence interval for the 
indirect effect was (-.051, .469) (For a complete discussion of the PROCESS model see Hayes, 
in press, or Preacher & Hayes, 2008).  The failure to find strong evidence for mediation in this 
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case is likely due to the fact that one of the critical relationships (anger  CFC) was not actually 
significant at the .05 alpha level.  
 Another way of conducting these regression analyses is to include all prior variables 
beyond the manipulation into the model as predictors at each step of the path analysis. Since 
condition is already included at each step, the only difference in this technique and the above 
procedure is the inclusion of anger as a predictor variable in the CFC – War support analysis. For 
the full data set, the CFC – War relationship remains significant, Beat = -.19, p = .05. However, 
for males only, the inclusion of post-manipulation anger does lessen this effect, and makes it non 
significant at the .05 alpha level, Beta = -.20, p = .16. This finding indicates that anger plays an 
important role in the CFC – War relationship for males. The implications of this are described 
further in the discussion section.  
Female participants only. 
 The relationships among and between the various pathways for the female participants is 
shown in Figure 9. None of these regression coefficients were significant for the relevant 
pathways for female participants.  
DISCUSSION 
 One of the overriding goals of Experiment 1 was to understand how time orientation may 
play a role when examining the relationship between anger and war attitudes.  In this study, time 
orientation was assessed by the Consideration of Future Consequences scale (CFC).  I consider 
two roles that CFC could have played in the current context, as both a mediator as well as 
moderator.  In the sections to follow, I shall discuss the implications of my data for these issues 
in turn.  
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Support for Mediation 
 Results did not generate any strong evidence for formal mediation, although the data did 
provide a hint of such effects for the male participants (see Figure 8). Given that the observed 
relationships are consistent with predictions, it would be useful to consider whether future 
research would be able to replicate these interesting (albeit weak) effects, at least for males. It 
should also be kept in mind that the regression analyses described above did, in fact, reveal a 
significant relationship between CFC and war attitudes. To my knowledge, this is the first study 
to demonstrate this relationship. Although these findings should be taken with a great deal of 
caution, they do suggest that time orientation—as measured by CFC—may be an important 
factor for understanding the relationship between anger and war. Apart from its role as a 
mediator, recall also that CFC did, in fact, emerge as a significant moderator of the relationship 
between anger and war attitudes.   
Support for Moderation 
 It should be kept in mind at the outset that a test of moderation is asking a question that is 
different from that of mediation. Unlike mediation (which is asking questions about changes in 
the proposed mediator), moderation does not actually presume that the moderator variable is 
changing at all. Rather, moderation is asking whether different processes are occurring at 
different “levels” of the proposed moderator.   
 My results did, in fact, show evidence of moderation involving CFC.  In particular, the 
nature of the relationship between anger and war attitudes was different, depending on the 
chronic time orientation of the participants.  Participants scoring low in CFC--those focused 
more on the present--became more supportive of war the angrier they became. In contrast, this 
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relationship did not emerge among participants scoring high in CFC, who were focused more on 
the future.  Thus, CFC appears to be a boundary condition fort the anger-war effect. 
Future research will be needed to fully understand the role of CFC in this dynamic, but it 
is possible that future orientation serves, in essence, to inhibit what would otherwise be a strong 
relationship between anger and attitudes towards war. In particular, participants who were high 
in CFC--and thus focused on future consequences of their actions—might have been able to 
inhibit these anger-produced cognitions. For this reason, therefore, anger did not lead to a change 
in war attitudes.  
 It is not entirely clear what this inhibition process consists of. Although we know that 
participants scoring high in CFC are thinking about future consequences to a greater extent 
generally speaking, we do not know what details they are thinking about. High CFC individuals 
are not necessarily thinking more than others, they are just thinking differently. CFC is a 
somewhat vague construct, and thus it is difficult to know what it is they are considering, in this 
particular circumstance, that does not allow anger to have the effect on their beliefs about war. 
That being said, it is likely that high CFC participants were more cognizant of some of the 
potentially negative long-term consequences of engaging in war. Future research should more 
precisely ask participants to list the positives and negatives of each side of the argument for both 
the long term and short term. I shall discuss this and other related issues in more detail in the 
General Discussion section. 
 
Other Moderator Effects 
 Aside from the moderating role of CFC, Experiment 1 revealed three moderators of the 
relationship between anger and war attitudes: political orientation, trait aggression, and gender.   
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 For political orientation, conservatives had a stronger anger and war attitudes relationship 
than liberals. Note that this is not merely saying that conservatives show more positivity for war 
than liberals. This finding indicates that for conservatives, as anger increases, support for war 
also increases, whereas liberals’ support for war is not affected by their current anger state. Other 
similar research has not found differences in political orientation for the anger – war attitudes 
relationship (Lambert et al., 2010). Because political orientation appears to be a factor in 
particular circumstances, future research should attempt to understand the boundary conditions 
for this effect. 
 Trait aggression also moderated the relationship between anger and war. Results 
indicated that individuals high in trait aggression became more pro war as their anger increased. 
For people low in trait aggression, anger had little to no effect on their war attitudes. This finding 
suggests that for these individuals who are generally not very aggressive people, increasing their 
anger does not make them any more inclined to support aggressive acts such as military 
engagement. However, for people who are dispositionally more aggressive, experiencing anger 
likely amplifies those aggressive tendencies. Because war provides an avenue for acting 
aggressively, the increase in anger leads to an increase in support for war. 
 For gender, it was the male participants who showed a positive relationship between 
anger and war. Females did showed a slight, but non-significant negative trend in the opposite 
direction. Research has shown that males are more likely to become physically aggressive 
(Eagley & Steffen, 1986), violent (Smith & Visher, 1980), and support war more than females 
(McDonald, Navarette, & Van Vugt, 2011). So, it is not surprising that males would support war 
with North Korea in the present example more than females. It is interesting, however, that war 
support for females was not affected by increased anger. Past studies pertaining specifically to 
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the relationship between anger and war have found that both males and females support war at 
higher levels when they are angry. Researchers interested in the anger – war effect should 
explore the particular conditions in which males and females differ in the way their attitudes 
towards war are affected by anger.  
 To summarize, three variables outside of CFC—gender, political ideology, and trait 
aggression moderated the strength of the relationship between anger and war attitudes.  Although 
these are distinct effects, there is a common link binding them together:  In each case, the 
strongest relationship between anger and war attitudes emerged among those participants who 
were already predisposed to support aggressive, hawkish policies. In the case of gender, there is 
a wealth of evidence showing that men (vs. women) tend to be more supportive of “aggressive” 
policies and my results show that the anger-war attitudes link was stronger for men.  Similar, 
there is a great deal of data showing that conservatives (vs. liberals) tend to be relatively more 
supportive of aggressive policies and my data show that the anger-war attitudes link was stronger 
for conservatives.  Finally, people high (vs. low) in trait aggression would, for somewhat obvious 
reasons, be more comfortable with the use of force in such context, and my data show that the 
anger-attitude link was stronger for participants high in trait aggression.  In other words, the 
stronger link between anger and support for war tended to emerge when the psychological 
makeup of the participant was conducive to the use of force in the first place. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Experiment 1 provided evidence that suggested that consideration of future consequences 
is affected by anger and helps to explain anger’s causal impact on attitudes towards war. The 
focus of Experiment 2 was to test for another potential causal mechanism, risk. 
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As noted earlier, I make an important conceptual distinction between two elements of 
risk: risk perception and risk preference. To reiterate, risk perception is an individual’s 
subjective belief that a particular positive or negative event will occur. Stated another way, it is 
the degree of risk that is believed to be involved in a particular situation. When measuring risk 
perception, I was interested in how much risk and pessimism participants currently perceive in 
their lives. Risk preference, on the other hand, refers to one’s willingness to engage in a 
particular behavior that carries potentially negative consequences. Risk preference tasks measure 
participants’ desire to engage in risky behaviors.  
 Previous research suggests that experiencing anger causes individuals to perceive less 
risk in a given situation. I predicted that this decrease in perceptions of risk would cause 
individuals to perceive less potential risk in a given war scenario, and therefore lead people to be 
more willing to support going to war. Feeling angry has also been associated with a tendency to 
take more risks. I hypothesized that this increased preference for risk would also cause 
individuals to be supportive of war, despite its inherent risks. I predicted that both risk perception 
and risk preference would act as mediators or moderators of the anger-war attitudes relationship.  
 
METHOD 
Participants and Design 
A total of 144 college undergraduates (60 male, 82 female; two participants failed to 
report their gender) participated in Experiment 2 for partial completion of course credit or $10. 
The present experiment consisted of two between-subjects factors. The first factor was whether 
participants were randomly assigned to the justice violation or the neutral mood condition. The 
second factor was the order in which they received the war attitude measurement and the war 
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likelihood estimates. In this sample, preliminary analyses of the data revealed four subjects with 
outlier scores on important variables (all of which had scores +2.75 SDs above or below the 
mean) including three with extreme scores on the mood task and one with the lowest possible 
score of self-reported effort. After exclusions were made, a total of 140 participants were used 
for formal analyses with 67 in the experimental condition and 73 in the control condition. 
All aspects of Experiment 2 were identical to that of Experiment 1, save for the 
measurement of risk, the proposed mediator/moderator which is described in the following 
section.  
Assessment of Risk 
Following the post manipulation mood measurement, all participants were given tasks to 
assess their risk perception and measure their preference for risk-seeking versus risk aversive 
decisional responses. The risk perception task consisted of likelihood estimates of various 
positive and negative life events related to the self.  Participants were presented with events such 
as “I acquired the flu” and “I married someone wealthy” and asked to rate the probability of that 
event happening to them in their lifetime on a 1 (extremely unlikely to happen to me) to 9 
(extremely likely to happen to me) scale. This risk preference construct had a reliability of .74. 
As noted earlier, there are several ways of measuring risk, but subjective estimates of likelihood 
represent a fairly common approach (Weinstein, 1980; Fischoff et al., 2005; Lerner & Keltner, 
2001) and are also less likely to produce some of the extreme skewing problems associated with 
questions that require participants to literally generate probabilities between 0 and 100. See 
Appendix A for a complete list of risk perception items.  
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Following this, participants were given three items to measure risk preference. The first 
task was based on the common “Asian Disease Problem” originally implemented by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1981). In this task, participants were given the following scenario:  
Imagine that the US is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual toxic
5
 disease, which is 
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been 
proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as 
follows.  
Program A:  If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.  
Program B:  If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and 
2/3 probability that no people will be saved. 
 Participants’ first measure of risk preference was to make a choice between Program A 
and Program B. To obtain a more precise measurement of their program preference, participants 
were also given a Likert scale with options ranging from 1 (I find Program A more attractive) to 
7 (I find Program B more attractive). This paradigm was originally used as a part of the 
measurement of the effects of framing gains and losses on decision-making and risk preference. 
Although framing effects of potential gains and losses are not of concern in the present study, 
this method was used because it was a valid measure of risk preference in the often cited paper 
by Lerner and Keltner (2001).  
Two additional scenarios were provided to measure risk preference. These two items 
were successfully implemented by Raghunathan and Pham (1999) in their study of the effects of 
sadness and anxiety on risky decision-making. One task presented participants with two 
gambles: Gamble A, which offered a 60% chance of winning $5 and Gamble B, which offered a 
30% chance of winning $10. Similar to the response options in the first risk preference task, 
51 
 
participants were asked to circle “A” if they prefer Gamble A, and “B” if they favored Gamble 
B. Next, participants were given a scale to evaluate the respective gambles with a response scale 
of 1 (I find Gamble A more attractive) to 7 (I find Gamble B more attractive). After the gamble 
task, participants were presented with an employment selection situation.  Here, they were told to 
imagine they were recently hired for two separate jobs, and that they must only choose one.  Job 
A was described as having a “High salary, with low job security” and Job B was described as 
having “Average salary with high job security”. As in the other two tasks, participants were 
asked to make a forced choice between Job A and Job B and were then given a scale with the 
response options of 1 (I find Job A more attractive) to 7 (I find Job B more attractive).  
All three of these scenarios contain one option with higher risk and one with lower risk. 
The higher risk options all contain relatively higher rewards but with lower probabilities of 
success. For example, in the Asian Disease Problem, Program B offers a high reward in that all 
600 individuals could be saved. It has a lower chance of occurring (1/3) than the other available 
option (2/3). Thus, participants who were willing to make behavioral choices with higher risk 
were more likely to favor these riskier options (Program B, Job A, Gamble B). 
In some research paradigms, it might be useful to form an overall composite measure of 
risk preference.  However, such an approach presumes that all of the relevant measures correlate 
with one another.  In some cases, the different measures of risk preference may actually be 
tapping relatively independent (i.e. largely uncorrelated) aspects of risk.  In this latter case, it is 
more appropriate to analyze each measure of risk preference separately (i.e. not form an overall 
composite).  
The latter approach clearly was more appropriate here.   This can be easily seen by the 
fact that none of the three measures of risk preference were actually correlated with one another.  
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(The highest correlation among the three items were that between Job and Gamble items, r = .14, 
p = .10.)  Hence, because each item appears to be tapping into a unique domain of risk 
preference, each of the three measures was used separately as their own assessment of risk 
preference. This method would increase type I error and would require a correction. However, 
none of these individual measures were found to be related to the experimental condition, or 
anger (all ps > .15) and thus they are not discussed further.  
Predictions  
I predicted that participants in the angry mood manipulation condition would show 
greater support for war with N. Korea in the hypothetical scenario than those in the neutral mood 
condition.  In addition, anger’s causal impact on support for war would be mediated by 
perceptions of risk and/or risk preferences. Anger should cause a decrease in perceptions of risk. 
People then would perceive less risk in the war scenario, and thus become more willing to 
support war. Also, feeling angry should make people more risk-taking, and therefore be more 
supportive of engaging in military conflict with North Korea.  
RESULTS 
Effects of the Experimental Manipulation on Anger 
 Participants in the anger induction condition expressed significantly higher ratings of 
anger compared to those in the control condition (Ms = 2.85 vs. 1.57), F(1, 139) = 30.40, p < 
.001, ηp
2
= .18. This finding, which is similar to that obtained in Experiment 1, again verifies that 
the experimental induction had its intended effects. The effect was not moderated by gender F(1, 
138) = 6.68, p > .25, or political orientation, F(1, 138) = .87, p >.25. Unlike Experiment 1, the 
manipulation did not significantly affect levels of anxiety (Ms = 2.60 vs. 2.31), F(1,139) = 1.32, 
p >.25. However, levels of sadness did differ as a function of condition, with higher levels of 
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sadness in the anger induction condition compared to control (Ms = 2.99 vs. 1.92), F(1,139) = 
16.52, p = .001, ηp
2
= .11.  Unlike Experiment 1, the assumptions of the analysis of covariance 
were met for both anxiety as well as sadness, and analyses indicated that the effects of the 
experimental manipulation on anger remained reliable, even after controlling for these two 
emotions, (adjusted Ms = 2.62 vs. 1.79), F(1,137) = 16.85, p = .001, ηp
2
= .11. In addition, no 
effects of the manipulation on anxiety or sadness were found after controlling for anger (all ps 
were not significant). 
Primary Analyses 
 Analyses revealed that the experimental condition did not have a significant effect on risk 
perception, risk preference, war attitudes, or perceptions of risk associated with the North Korea 
conflict. Thus, aside from anger, there were no direct effects of the anger condition on the key 
variables of the study.  First, I tested if anger and war attitudes were causally related. Analysis 
showed the relationship was in the expected positive direction, but was not statistically 
significant (Beta = .12, p = .26). With this sample, gender did not moderate the effect and there 
were no clear differences between males and females in the strength of the relationship. This was 
somewhat surprising, given the large gender effects found in Experiment 1. None of the other 
trait variables moderated the association of anger and war attitudes. In addition, anger was not 
related to attitudes in perceived risks associated with war.  
 As with Experiment 1, the intervening variable in the present experiment, risk perception, 
was tested separately for both moderation and mediation of the anger and war attitudes 
relationship. Analyses showed that risk perception did, in fact, moderate the relationship between 
anger and war attitudes, B = .31, p < .05. However, the nature of this moderator effect was not 
what I had predicted.  I had anticipated that there would be a strong positive correlation between 
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anger and war attitudes (i.e. more anger predicting more pro-war attitudes), provided that 
participants manifested low perceptions of risk. In fact, the exact opposite happened.   In 
particular, participants scoring high in risk perception (1 SD above the mean) tended to show 
strong associations between anger and war attitudes, B = .34, p < .05. In contrast, participants 
who perceived low amounts of risk (1 SD below the mean) showed a non-significant negative 
relationship between anger and war, B = -.17, p > .25.  Hence, it was the participants who saw 
the world as a risky place who showed the strong association between anger and pro-war 
attitudes.   I had anticipated, however, that this effect would mostly emerge among participants 
who saw the world in relatively non-risky terms.   
To understand if risk perception had any indirect effects on the main variables of interest, 
I conducted further regression analyses similar to the path analyses presented in Experiment 1, 
with risk perception replacing Consideration of Future Consequences as the intervening variable 
in this analysis. First, condition and anger were again strongly related, Beta = .46, p < .001 
Analyses showed that anger and risk perception were marginally related Beta = .18, p = .10. 
However, the effect’s direction is opposite of what was predicted. Anger was predicted to cause 
lower levels of risk perception; however in this experiment anger has a small tendency to cause 
higher levels of perceived risk (see ahead in the discussion section for a further analysis and 
commentary on this issue). Next, I examined the relationship between risk perception and war 
attitudes. This analysis showed no significant relationship between perceptions of risk and 
attitudes towards U.S. involvement in a war against North Korea, Beta = -.08, p > .25. This also 
was counter to predictions, which stated that low levels of risk perception would lead to higher 
levels of support for war.  For the sake of completion, I present, in Figure 10, the full set of these 
regression coefficients. Analysis using the PROCESS serial multiple mediation procedure from 
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Experiment 1, confirmed the null effects and showed that risk perception did not act as a 
mediating variable, CI.95 = (-.142, .012).   
 
DISCUSSION 
 Experiment 2’s finding that increased anger was not significantly associated with lower 
perceptions of risk or higher preference for risk was indeed surprising. This was unexpected 
because Experiment 2 was based partially on the findings of the widely-cited article by Lerner 
and Keltner (2001) on emotion and risk. In their study, they found that anger was associated with 
lower levels of risk perception and higher levels of risk preference. Although there are a number 
of key features that differentiate the Lerner and Keltner study and my experiment, none provide a 
clear explanation for the difference in results.  
A Closer Look at the Lerner and Keltner (2001) Paradigm 
 In their first experiment Lerner and Keltner (2001) found a significant correlation 
between anger and risk preference. The present study and Lerner and Keltner both used the 
Asian Disease problem as a measure of risk preference. However, for anger, Lerner used a 
dispositional measure of anger. My main operationalization of anger is a state measure using an 
expanded version of the PANAS.  However, I also measured trait anger with a measure similar to 
the one used by Lerner and Keltner (2001; Spielberger, 1985). In the present study, neither the 
trait nor state measures of anger were related to scores on the risk preference measure.  
 Lerner conducted three additional studies that investigated anger and risk perception.  All 
three studies used a variant of the risk perception measure utilized in the present study. This 
measure was the Weinstein (1980) likelihood estimates task, in which participants state how 
likely they expected a given negative or positive life event to happen to them (i.e. “Graduating in 
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top third of class”). For anger, two of their studies used a version of the Spielberger trait anger 
scale whereas one study used a state anger measure (responses to the term “angry” and “mad”) 
after an anger manipulation. This latter study was clearly the most similar to what was used in 
the present Experiment 2, yet their study found a significant anger-risk preference relationship, 
and the present study did not. However, in my study, one measure of anger is in fact negatively 
associated with risk perceptions as predicted. Using the state pre-measure of anger, analysis 
found a significant relationship, B = -.17, p < .05, (controlling for state pre-measures of sadness 
and anxiety, B = -.26, p = .01). It is unclear why this baseline state anger measure, and not the 
post manipulation anger measure, was related to risk preference.  
 In addition, a recent dissertation by Lane (2012) also found inconsistent evidence of an 
anger-risk perception effect. In this paper, participants’ levels of anger and risk perceptions of 
terrorism were measured at three time points: two weeks, one year, and three years after the 9/11 
attacks.  Lane found anger and risk perception to be significantly negatively related in two of the 
three time points, but only when controlling for anxiety and sadness. Thus, in this study, the 
anger – risk perception effect seems to be somewhat inconsistent and only occurring when 
controlling for other negative emotions. One possible explanation of these diverging results is 
that the anger – risk preference/perception effect is actually quite small and inconsistent.  
 These failures to replicate do not invalidate the previously published studies.  However, it 
does call into question the size and consistency of the effect. Future research should investigate 
the anger and risk relationships to better understand the conditions in which the relationship is 
found and the size and validity of the effect. One limitation to this study that may have affected 
risk perception scores is that the order of the likelihood estimates and the risky choice tasks was 
not counterbalanced. It is possible that completion of the likelihood estimates affected the 
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manner in which participants responded to the risk preference items. In particular, some of the 
negative life events (contracting a venereal disease, getting lung cancer) may have made serious 
negative consequences salient, and thus caused people to respond in a manner that was less risky. 
However, this issue would not affect likelihood estimates and therefore not provide an 
explanation of why the anger - risk perception relationship did not replicate past studies. 
 Experiment 2 did produce a surprising finding as part of risk perception’s moderating 
effect on anger – war support. Here, people with high levels of risk perception became more pro-
war as they became angrier, and people scoring low in risk perception did not have a significant 
anger – war effect. This is surprising because people with high risk perception are people who 
tend to see a great deal of risk in given situations. Thus, I predicted that these would be the type 
of people who would see an unacceptable amount of risk in going to war with North Korea, and 
their anger would not affect their war attitudes because of these concerns about the riskiness of 
the situation. Likewise, people who do not see much risk should have their war attitudes 
increased by the experience of anger. I do not have a clear explanation for this effect. One 
possibility is that high risk perceivers actually thought there was more risk in not going to war, as 
the threat from North Korea seemed too strong. Future research should continue to explore the 
role of risk in anger and war support, especially by using different types of war scenarios that 
vary on their amount of risk. 
 
EXPERIMENT 3 
 Experiments 1 and 2 investigated what people were thinking, whereas Experiment 3 was 
concerned with how people were thinking. That is, the final study was concerned with the 
possibility that the activation of anger might decrease the probability that people engage in 
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controlled processing.  This possibility is important because it suggests another possible 
underlying mechanism that could explain the anger and war attitudes relationship. 
 In particular, I hypothesized that one reason people support governments’ engaging in 
war is because they are experiencing decreased cognitive control and are using shallow 
processing to consume war-relevant information. More specifically, people are not thinking 
carefully and systematically about some of the negative, future outcomes of war such as civilian 
and military casualties and monetary costs. In addition, I hypothesized that this shallow 
processing style is a consequence of experiencing anger. In order to test these assumptions I used 
the anger manipulation presented in the previous two studies and measured cognitive control 
through an antisaccade paradigm. Although Experiment 3 had the drawback of being the most 
exploratory of the three studies, it also had the most potential of producing results that would 
expand our understanding of anger’s effects on war attitudes and anger’s effects on cognitive 
functioning in general.  
METHOD 
Participants and Design  
 In Experiment 3, 127 subjects (61 males, 65 females, one participant did not report 
gender) participated for partial completion of course credit or $10 in payment. The present 
experiment consisted of one between-subjects factor: whether participants were randomly 
assigned to the justice violation or the neutral mood condition. Preliminary analyses of the data 
resulted in eight participant exclusions. Two participants were removed for extreme scores 
(+2.75 SDs of the above or below the mean). One was an outlier on the antisaccade measure and 
another on the self-reported effort task. Six additional participants were not included for 
noncompliance including (a) two participants who did not follow instructions on the writing 
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tasks, (b) three who did not follow instructions on the antisaccade task and (c) one who refused 
to complete the experiment. In total, 119 subjects (59 in the control condition and 60 in the 
experimental condition) were used for analysis.  
All aspects of Experiment 3 were identical to that of Experiment 1, save for the 
measurement of cognitive control, the proposed mediator/moderator that is discussed in the 
following section.  
Assessment of Cognitive Control 
Cognitive control was measured using an antisaccade task (Everling & Fischer, 1998; 
Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001; Payne, 2005). Each trial of the antisaccade task 
contained three parts: a fixation point, a cue, and a target. Trials began with a fixation point 
appearing in the middle of the screen for 2,000 ms. After the fixation point disappeared, the cue 
(a red circle) appeared in one of two possible locations: the left side of the screen or the right 
side. The cue was present for a total of 400 ms. Following the cue, the target then also appeared 
on either the left or right side of the screen. The target was either an “H” or a “T” and was 
present for 60 ms
6
.  After the 60 ms elapsed, a pound symbol appeared and acted as a mask for 
the target. For each trial, participants were asked to respond by indicating if they saw an H or a T 
as quickly as possible. Each participant’s number of errors was the main dependent variable for 
the task.   
Participants completed two blocks. The first block was the “prosaccade” block.  In this 
block, the target always appeared on the same side as the cue. However in block 2 (the 
“antisaccade” block) the target always appeared on the opposite side of the cue. Each block 
contained 48 trials for a total of 96 trials. 
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The logic behind the task is that participants focus their attention on the cue based on an 
automatic orienting response to stimuli on the screen. With attention drawn to one particular side 
of the screen, their ability to accurately identify the target is either facilitated or hindered. When 
the position of the cue and target are congruent, performance is facilitated because participants 
are already attending to the side of the screen in which the target appears. However, when the 
target is presented on the opposing side of the cue, the cue acts as a distracter. On these trials, the 
cue hinders one’s ability to view and accurately identify the target because attending to the cue 
means one must quickly shift attention to the other side of the screen to view the target. The 
presentation speed of the cue is fast enough to where shifting attention and still accurately 
identifying the target is quite difficult. In order to provide an accurate response, the optimal 
strategy is for participants to resist attending to the cue. However, this is difficult because people 
have an automatic orienting response towards viewing an object as it appears on the screen (in 
this case, the cue). This ability to override one’s impulse to attend to the cue and thus wait for the 
target to appear in order to view and accurately identify the target is the measure of cognitive 
control. Because performance on block 1 is presumed to be independent of cognitive control 
levels, errors on block 2 served as the main dependent variable of cognitive control in this 
experiment.  
Predictions 
I predicted participants who complete the angry mood manipulation would show more 
positivity towards military engagement with North Korea in the hypothetical scenario than those 
in the neutral mood condition. Anger’s effects on war support would be mediated by scores on 
the cognitive control measure. Those who evidence limited cognitive control (high numbers of 
errors) will be more supportive of the war than participants who have higher cognitive control 
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(low numbers of errors). This is because limited cognitive control indicates an inability to inhibit 
the use of shallow, heuristic-based information processing style, and an inability to override the 
“primitive” aggressive urges brought on by the experience of anger. Using this heuristic 
processing style and not inhibiting these aggressive tendencies would lead participants to not 
think carefully or comprehensively about the factors related to the war scenario. This lack of 
inhibition and detailed processing would then lead to higher support for military conflict with 
North Korea. 
RESULTS 
Effects of the Experimental Manipulation on Anger 
Consistent with Experiments 1 and 2, analysis of variance revealed that participants in the 
justice violation condition reported higher levels of anger than participants in the control 
condition, (Ms = 3.54 vs. 1.81), F(1, 118) = 30.46, p < .001, ηp
2
= .21. The effect of condition on 
anger was not moderated by either gender F(1,117) = 0.08, p > .25 or political orientation 
F(1,117) = 1.00, p > .25. For Experiment 3, the experimental condition did not affect anxiety 
ratings, (Ms = 2.95 vs. 2.52), F(1,118) = 1.95, p = .17. However, participants in the justice 
violation condition had higher ratings of sadness (Ms = 3.30 vs. 2.32), F(1,118) = 7.74, p < .01, 
ηp
2
= .06. As with the previous experiments, I tested the effects of the manipulation on both anger 
and sadness while including the other relevant negative emotions as covariates. An ANCOVA 
with anger as the dependent variable and anxiety as a covariate
7
 showed that condition still had a 
significant effect on anger (Ms = 3.42 vs. 1.93), F(1,117) = 30.86, p < .001, ηp
2
= .21. However, 
there was no significant difference between the control condition and the justice violation 
condition on sadness when controlling for anger and anxiety (Ms = 2.71 vs. 2.92), F(1,116) = 
0.62, p > .25. Replicating the previous two experiments, in Experiment 3, when controlling for 
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the other negative emotions, only levels of anger were significantly different between the justice 
violation condition and the control condition.   
Primary Analyses 
Next, I tested the experimental condition’s effect on the key variables in Experiment 3. 
As described above, the variable that differentiates Experiment 3 is participant’s score on the 
antisaccade task. Each person’s level of cognitive control is represented by the number of errors 
made on block 2 of the task. Higher numbers of errors indicated a lack of cognitive control. 
Overall, participants averaged 6.60 errors on the 48 trials presented in this block, with a range of 
0 to 22. Analysis showed that participants’ error scores were not associated with any pre 
measures. Analysis of variance showed that errors on block 2 were not significantly different 
between the two conditions (Ms = 6.72 vs. 6.47), F(1,118) = 0.07, p > .25. Scores on war 
attitudes also were not affected by the condition participants were in (Ms = 3.91 vs. 3.72), 
F(1,118) = 0.35, p > .25. As with the previous three studies, the main independent variable 
(condition) did not affect the criterion variable (war attitudes).   
Next, I investigated the relationship between anger and war attitudes. This relationship 
was in the predicted positive direction, but was not statistically significant, Beta = .18, p > .10. In 
Experiment 3, only trait aggression moderated the anger-war attitudes relationship. This is quite 
different from the results of Experiment 1 in which anger-war attitudes was moderated by four 
variables. Further exploration of the nature of the interaction revealed that participants scoring 
low on trait aggression actually had a stronger relationship between anger and pro-war attitudes, 
B = .30, p < .06, than people who scored higher on trait aggression, B = -.003, p > .25. It is 
unclear why participants who scored low on trait aggression might have showed a stronger anger 
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– war relationship.  Hence, pending replication of this surprising effect it seemed best to avoid 
speculating on its meaning.   
As with the preceding experiments, I tested the impact of the proposed intervening 
variable. For Experiment 3, this variable was cognitive control and was measured by the 
antisaccade task, as both a moderator and a mediator of the anger – war attitudes relationship. 
Contrary to predictions, analyses showed that errors on block 2 of the antisaccade task did not 
moderate the association between anger and war attitudes, Beta = -.34, p > .10. Cognitive control 
was tested as an intervening variable through regression analysis similar to those conducted in 
the previous experiments and is presented in Figure 11. In the first path of these analyses, anger 
was regressed onto condition, which resulted in a strong positive relationship, Beta = .45, p < 
.001. Next, analysis revealed no relationship between anger and cognitive control, Beta = .09, p 
> .25. The next step in the path analysis showed no relationship between errors and attitudes 
towards war with North Korea, Beta = -.03, p > .25. Thus the hypothesis that the relationship 
between anger and war attitudes was partially due to changes in cognitive control was not 
supported by the present study. Higher levels of anger were marginally associated with war risk 
estimates, Beta = .21, p = .08, however block 2 errors and war risk estimates were not at all 
related, Beta = .05, p > .25. Analysis with serial multiple mediation using Hayes’ PROCESS 
macro confirmed these null results, CI.95 = (-.109, .028). 
DISCUSSION 
 In Experiment 3 I found that levels of cognitive control were unrelated to the 
experimental condition, discrete emotional experiences, and attitudes towards war. Thus, the 
present results failed to support the hypothesis that experiences of anger affect cognitive control 
abilities, which would in turn lead to higher levels of support for war. However, I do not believe 
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this notion should be necessarily rejected as an explanation for why anger affects war attitudes. 
This particular study was the most “exploratory” of all three experiments and there were a 
number of limitations that may have precluded results from aligning with the stated hypothesis.  
 One issue to consider is that the antisaccade task may not have been the best way to 
measure the inhibition processes that I predicted would mediate the anger – war relationship. As 
a reminder, I proposed that anger would lead to two important changes: angry individuals would 
be unable to inhibit their motivation to process information less carefully, and would also be 
unable to inhibit the aggressive impulses that considering war creates. The link I proposed 
between the task and these processes is that they both would be related to the concept of 
inhibiting a dominant response. For the antisaccade task, participants attempted to resist the 
dominant orienting response of attending to the cue (the red circle). I also proposed that pro-war 
participants do not inhibit their anger-derived automatic motivation to respond aggressively or to 
inhibit the motivation to process information heuristically. However, inhibiting one’s gaze at a 
circle on the screen and inhibiting an automatic positivity towards war may very well be quite 
different processes. Inhibition is a concept with a great deal of complexities, and these particular 
types of inhibition may have very different cognitive and motivational processes that drive them.  
Thus, the processes measured by the antisaccade task may not have been a good representation 
of the hypothesized inhibition processes that lead to pro-war attitudes. 
 Another potential impediment was the amount of time between the anger manipulation 
and the completion of the war attitudes task. Based on personal experience with the materials and 
pilot testing, the Experiment 3 cognitive control task took much longer to complete than 
Experiment 1’s CFC scale and Experiment 2’s risk estimate scale and three risk preferences 
items. This additional time between the manipulation and dependent variable may have caused 
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the induced anger to dissipate and limit its effect on both the cognitive control task and the war 
attitudes task.  
 Despite the results of Experiment 3, I believe it is important for future research to explore 
the relationship between anger, cognitive control, and war support. Specifically studies should 
look at alternative ways of measuring information processing other than the antisaccade task. I 
will consider this and other potential limitations of the present research at the end of the General 
Discussion.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 Research on anger has demonstrated that anger is a potent emotion. Intense experiences 
of anger can lead to negative outcomes in all facets of life including harming social relationships, 
problematic work performance, and lower levels of physical and mental health. In order to better 
understand and manage these outcomes, researchers have investigated the psychological factors 
that are affected by anger and that lead to these negative consequences. These factors include 
anger’s effects on broad psychological constructs such as judgment and decision-making, 
cognitive processing, and attitude formation.  For my dissertation I combined a number of these 
sets of consequences to better understand anger and its outcomes. Specifically, my goal was to 
explain and understand the boundary conditions of anger’s effect on one particular attitude 
object, war support, by investigating processes such as judgment, perceptions, and cognitions. 
The present study found some support that one construct, Consideration of Future Consequences, 
plays an important role in the anger – war effect, but cast doubt on the two other hypothesized 
mediators: risk and cognitive control. The results also raise a number of other important issues I 
will discuss in the following sections. 
Anger and War Attitudes 
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One of the more interesting and surprising results of the present set of experiments is the 
unstable nature of the anger and war attitudes association. Anger, whether in the form of trait 
anger, experimentally induced state anger, or naturally occurring anger, has consistently been 
related to war support, and in some cases causally increased support for war (Lambert, 2010; 
Huddy, 2003; Sadler, 2005; Skitka, 2006). My studies show a small effect in Experiment 1 for 
the full sample, but a large effect for males. Experiment 2 and 3 both show a relationship in the 
expected direction, but the effect is not statistically significant and does not depend on gender. 
This is somewhat puzzling given the available evidence in published studies.  
Although I believe the evidence asserting an anger – war attitudes relationship is larger 
than the evidence against it, the current studies put into question the size and consistency of the 
effect.  It is possible the anger – war link is a very small effect and therefore studies will not 
always produce this outcome due to random variation. It could also be that anger only affects 
war attitudes in specific situations and does not generalize to all conceptualizations of anger or 
wars. There is also the possibility that the classic “file drawer” problem affects perceptions of the 
relationship. That is, it’s possible that only the studies that found a relationship were published 
and thus all knowledge of the effect is based on those particular studies. A meta-analysis of past 
studies (published and unpublished) would be helpful to understand the consistency and general 
size of the effect.  
In terms of the present study, there are a few methodological factors that may have 
contributed to underwhelming size of the anger-war attitudes relationship. One is the 
experimental manipulation of anger. For this manipulation participants were instructed to write 
about a time in their life they felt they were treated extremely unfairly. When people perceive 
their sense of justice or fairness is violated, the dominant emotional response is anger. Results of 
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the present studies confirm this fact. In all three experiments anger was higher for the treatment 
condition than the control condition. Thus, the justice violation was effective in affecting 
participants’ self-reported anger. However, the manipulation was not significantly related to 
other important variables such as war attitudes or the three proposed mediators.  
It is possible there is something about this particular emotional trigger that causes its 
emotional impact to be lacking in strength or duration. The manipulation did not produce 
objectively strong increases in anger. In all three studies, the experimental group’s average anger 
ratings were less than 4, which is under the midpoint of the scale of 4.5. Thus, the current studies 
cannot comment on what affect anger would have if the manipulation produced much higher 
ratings of anger. It is possible, and quite logical, that much higher ratings of anger (for example, 
anger at the midpoint and above) could produce effects where null results were found in the 
present studies, and could produce a stronger anger-war correlation.  Recent research in my lab 
has also demonstrated that this justice violation manipulation increased anger ratings, but did not 
directly affect the other dependent variables in the experiment (Lambert, Peak, Eadeh, Scherer, 
& Schott, 2012, Experiment 4). Other more direct triggers of anger such as feelings of 
frustration, threats to reputation, disrespect, goal blockage, or simply asking participants to write 
about a time they felt anger specifically, could produce stronger experiences of anger. These 
longer-lasting and intense experiences in the lab may result in a clearer impact on psychological 
constructs. These triggers may also have higher external validity by more closely mimicking the 
experience of anger and its consequences in everyday life. Future research should investigate 
how the use of different emotion manipulations impacts the relationship between anger and war 
attitudes.  
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 Another unique aspect of this dissertation is the operationalization of war attitudes. Past 
studies on anger and war have assessed attitudes towards the Iraq War, the Afghan War, and the 
“War on Terror” as their measure of war support. This is not at all surprising considering these 
studies were all conducted in the 2000s while these military events were ongoing and an ever-
present topic in the news media. However at the time the present study was conducted (Fall 
2011), the Iraq War was at a close and the Afghan War was no longer a widely discussed news 
topic. My concern with asking participants views of the war is that people would not have 
meaningful opinions because they simply would not know what the current situation was.  
 Because there were no other current wars with direct American involvement, I elected to 
create a hypothetical, yet realistic scenario for an American military conflict. However, it is 
possible that the North Korea/United States conflict presented in the war passage lead to a few 
issues that prevented a stronger anger – war attitudes effect. The most obvious difference 
between the North Korea war scenario and the war attitude measures of past studies is that the 
present scenario forced participants to contemplate and imagine the presented military situation 
was currently happening and develop an opinion of how the United States would handle it 
moving forward. The additional cognitive effort required by the task (reading and understanding 
the passage, writing out their thoughts) may have weakened their level of anger and its impact on 
“hawkish” attitudes.  
 Another difference between these two types of war measures is that items concerning the 
Iraq/Afghan Wars are nearly always pertaining to the continuation of war. In contrast, the North 
Korea scenario was about beginning a military conflict. This is an important distinction because 
it may be that the consequences of anger are more pronounced when continuing a current 
behavior or attitude versus embarking on a brand new set of thoughts and actions.
8
 Future studies 
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should attempt to vary the “real vs. hypothetical” war factor and whether the conflict in question 
is a continuation of, or a start to, military engagement.   
The role of Immediacy in Consideration of Future Consequences and War 
 
 In order to fully understand the implications of the results of Experiment 1, it is important 
to take a step back and discuss the key differences between people who score high versus low on 
the CFC scale. Those scoring low on CFC are most concerned with immediacy. They will gladly 
trade negative experiences later for good fortune today. Importantly, they will attempt to 
maximize immediate benefits, even at the expense of future costs.  These immediate benefits can 
come in two main forms: experiencing hedonically pleasing events or avoiding negative 
experiences. For someone who scores low in CFC, this tendency to maximize immediate benefits 
could affect behavior in two distinct contexts. One is a situation in which the individual chooses 
behavior with a hedonically pleasurable outcome in the present but yields negative consequences 
in the future. An example of this would be choosing to smoke cigarettes.  Smoking cigarettes is 
often evaluated as a positive immediate experience, yet can have extremely negative effects in 
the long term. A separate situation is one in which an individual who is  low on CFC would 
choose to avoid a negative experience in the present that eventually causes a lack of a positive 
outcome in the future.  An example of such a scenario would be someone choosing not to do the 
hard work involved with studying for a difficult college exam, which results in poor academic 
performance and limited opportunities in the future. In this example, the individual is not 
necessarily behaving in a way that will reap extremely positive benefits in the short term, but 
instead is acting to avoid negative feelings. In both situations people are maximizing the benefits 
of the present in detriment to their future, but they differ in whether that immediate benefit is 
pleasurable or merely just avoiding a negative, unpleasant experience in the short term.  This 
difference is important to fully understand the effects of CFC on behavior and the fact that it can 
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vary depending on the given situation, including the topic of this present work – CFC and war 
support. 
 My results indicate that CFC ratings are related to attitudes towards war. Because people 
who score low on CFC maximize immediate benefits in the manner discussed above, this leads 
to the question of which form of maximization took place. One could make an argument for 
either.  It is possible that supporting an American military attack on North Korea would provide 
a moment of immediate pleasure. Evidence suggests that taking aggressive actions, such as 
engaging in war, can produce positive feelings. One reason for this positivity can be revenge. 
Revenge is associated with positivity and specifically expectations of positive feelings (see 
Lambert, Eadeh, Peak, & Schott, 2012 for a full discussion). In the war passage of this study, 
bombing North Korea could be seen as an act of revenge, and thus present an opportunity to 
maximize immediate hedonic pleasure.  However, it is also possible that low CFC individuals 
supported this war because doing so would protect them from aversive, negative feelings. This 
could be the case if individuals believed that in the U.S.-North Korea war scenario, North Korea 
would soon be attacking the United States and its allies. To prevent this clearly negative 
immediate outcome, individuals with a temporal orientation focused on the near-term, may then 
be willing to take action and go to war to prevent this outcome in the present, regardless of what 
the distant future outcome may be.  It is also conceivable that both acquiring positive and 
avoiding negative experiences in the present are motivations occurring simultaneously for those 
people scoring low in CFC in this study.  
 This helps us to explain why low CFCers were supportive of American military 
involvement with North Korea. There are also a few notable reasons why high CFCers were 
against the war. The fact that there is a negative relationship between CFC and war support 
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indicates that when people were thinking more about the long term ramifications of the war they 
tended to support the war less. This result strongly implies that there were indeed a number of 
negative long-term consequences that influenced their negative attitudes towards military 
conflict by the United States. In the writing section, participants cited concerns over greater 
instability in the region, and fears of both monetary costs and loss of life. They also cited that a 
long war could deplete the military and a war in that region may increase the likelihood of a 
conflict with China because the Chinese are unlikely to tolerate a protracted war off their Eastern 
Coast. All of these reasons are likely to apply to almost any war and therefore implies that CFC 
and war attitudes may be negatively related in general, and not just specifically to this particular 
war scenario.  
Awareness/Concern models of CFC  
 In the previous section I discussed how maximizing benefits in the immediate setting can 
take on multiple forms for low CFCers. It is important then to follow up on this by noting that 
the broader literature on CFC has discussed the various ways in which future consequences are 
processed by participants who score low in CFC. Joireman, Strathman, and Balliet (2006) have 
proposed two models to explain how low CFCers approach future outcomes: the Awareness 
Model and the Concern Model. The Awareness Model presumes that people who score high or 
low in CFC differ in that the latter are not even aware of the future consequences of their current 
behavior.  These people are not considering future consequences because they do not even know 
of them. Thus, these consequences do not impact their current decision-making because they are 
not aware of their existence. For example, an individual may choose not to eat vegetables at all 
during their life because they are unaware of the positive, long-term benefits of doing so. In 
contrast, the Concern Model proposes that both high and low scorers on CFC are indeed aware 
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of the potential positive or negative future outcomes of their current behavior. The difference lies 
in their sensitivity to future consequences. High CFCers are very concerned about whether these 
long term outcomes are pleasant or unpleasant whereas those on the opposite end of the spectrum 
place a low priority on ramifications that are far off and seemingly distant. Thus, it is focus, not 
awareness that is the explanatory mechanism in the Concern Model. 
 I am not proposing one over the other in the current study.  However, these models do 
present differing accounts of why low CFCers may have been more supportive of war, and it is 
helpful to present these accounts to gain a clearer understanding of my results.  An explanation 
consistent with the Awareness model would be that participants scoring low in CFC were not 
cognizant of potential long term negative (or positive) consequences of war. Something about 
their current state (possibly experiencing anger) prevented these participants from generating 
cognitions related to long term outcomes of the presented scenario.  In contrast, the Concern 
Model would explain my results as low CFCers considering potential outcomes of the war but 
not putting much weight on these distinct consequences, and instead basing their choices on the 
current (presumably positive) consequences of war.  Thus, they may have been fully aware of the 
possible outcome of a huge financial and military cost, but did not put much weight into this 
possibility. Although both models agree on the end result, they differ in their view of the roads 
taken by low CFCers to arrive at their attitudes and judgments.  
Implications of Temporal Orientation as a Moderator Variable 
As noted above, the fact that individuals who are focused on rewards in the short term 
over the long term showed a stronger anger – war relationship, indicates that people perceive 
that they will experience a type of positive benefit in the present if they go to war. Put simply, 
people who are angry and focusing on the short term will likely be more supportive of war.  This 
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has important practical implications for the political leaders’ and the general public’s views of 
war.  
For example, if a political entity would like to alter the opinions of a group of politicians 
or the mass public towards an anti-war position, it may help to have them consider the longer 
term consequences of military conflict. It is possible that individuals focus their attention on the 
present factors and consequences of military actions by default. That is, they automatically 
consider the present consequences to a greater degree than future considerations.  Research 
suggests this is indeed the case when people are angry (Gray, 1999). A simple reminder to “think 
long-term” may cause individuals to stop and consider outcomes down the road and then 
decrease their support for the war.  
Instead of focusing on how the war may be beneficial in the present (reduce a threat, 
revenge) having them imagine the long-term consequences or simply listing the potential future 
negative effects of war (monetary costs, loss of civilian and military lives, possible escalation of 
the war) may shift attitudes in the anti-war direction.  In contrast, pro-war entities should do the 
reverse and highlight the perceived short-term benefits of engaging in war to increase 
favorability for their side.  
It is important to note that this strategy of focusing on the future may increase pro-war 
sentiment in some circumstances. If the situation is such that a threat to a home country is most 
likely far in the future (i.e., an adversary does not have military power to attack now, but will in 
ten years), this increased attention to the future may cause the public to become more favorable 
to war in the present.  
 
Consideration of Future Consequences and Political Attitudes 
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 Another question raised by the present studies is whether considering future 
consequences and political attitudes are related constructs.  Both sides of the political spectrum 
could easily make the case that their ideology is focused on long-term consequences while the 
opposing political view is overly short-sighted. For example, political liberals would argue that 
conservatives do not think about the long-term effects of pollution and climate change or the 
hedonically pleasurable, but morally problematic use of torture on terrorists. On the other hand 
conservatives might say liberals do not think about the long-term financial consequences of the 
growth of federal entitlement programs or the future consequences of “soft” punishments for 
terrorists and other criminals. 
 Experiment 1’s finding that considering immediate consequences over future 
consequences is associated with the politically conservative position of supporting war, does 
provide some evidence (albeit, only on one policy issue) of a negative relationship between CFC 
and conservatism. Some past research has also indicated that CFC is associated with politically 
conservative policy initiatives. However there is reason to be cautious about making this 
conclusion. First, political orientation and CFC are only marginally related in the present study (r 
= -.17, p = .08). However it is important to note that both RWA (r = -.06, p = .50) and SDO (r = 
-.18, p = .06) correlate in the same negative direction as political orientation, with SDO also 
showing a marginally significant relationship. Thus, the current results do not indicate a strong 
association between CFC and political attitudes. Second, past research has suggested that high 
CFC scores correlate with support for pro-environmental causes such as off-shore drilling 
(Strathman, 1994), public transportation (Joireman, Van Lange, & Van Vugt, 2004) and higher 
rates of recycling (Ebreo & Vining, 2001; Lindsay & Strathman, 1997). However, a closer look 
at the Strathman (1994) paper reveals that CFC is not always related to conservative policies in 
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their studies. Although this paper is cited as showing that CFC is related to decreased support for 
oil drilling, it also shows that this effect is dependent on its framing. When advantages of oil 
drilling are framed as occurring in the future, it is actually high CFC individuals supporting oil 
drilling. Thus, at least in the case of domestic oil drilling, it is the temporal framing of the 
advantages and disadvantages that is determining responses and not merely the possibility of 
overlapping properties between CFC and conservatism. The combination of the current results 
and past studies does indicate that High CFC scores may lean closer towards liberalism than 
conservatism. 
 The ways in which CFC may affect political attitudes (or vice versa) is an important area 
for future research. Clearly, neither political orientation’s policy preferences are always geared 
toward maximizing the long-term consequences of their actions. However, it is possible that state 
or trait CFC levels may be generally associated with one type of political orientation or the other.  
Just as conscientiousness and openness are two personality factors related to political attitudes, 
CFC may also be one such factor.  Future research should investigate this issue at the trait level, 
as well as how situational forces can affect state CFC and political attitudes simultaneously.  
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 There is a great deal we do not understand about anger and how it affects people’s 
support for military action. The results of the present studies show that there are key areas future 
research should explore concerning the anger – war attitudes effect, including its mechanisms 
and boundary conditions.  
Research on Anger and War Attitudes 
 Researchers should continue to explore the strength of the anger – war effect and explore 
the conditions in which anger does and does not affect beliefs about war. My results indicate that 
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the effect may not be as robust and consist as previously believed. Researchers should utilize 
differing measurements of state and trait anger, as well as anger manipulations to see how using 
various operationalizations of anger affects the anger-war attitudes relationship. As discussed 
previously, war attitudes should be measured using a number of different methods.  These 
include using Likert scales to assess attitudes about current wars, views of war in the abstract, 
and hypothetical wars, to understand how effects differ between these variations. In regards to 
the latter method, the present results indicate that measurement using hypothetical war passages 
may reduce the effect and are likely less generalizable. However, based on just these studies, 
there is no way to know if these effects were idiosyncratic to the specific war scenario devised 
for this project, or if they apply to all manufactured war situations.  
 Also, I am not aware of any studies that test if anger’s effect only pertains to wars that 
involve participants’ “home” countries. Studies conducted in the United States have measured 
war attitudes with the war in question directly involving the U.S. (i.e. Iraq and Afghanistan). It is 
not clear if anger increases support for military engagement for countries of which one is neither 
a citizen nor a resident. For example, if American participants have a positive anger and war 
correlation when the countries in conflict are two African nations, this implies that the effect of 
anger  generalizes out to support for war in a very broad way. Importantly, this would imply that 
anger’s influence on war attitudes is not exclusively based on perceptions of threat to one’s self 
or country. Because America is highly unlikely to be affected by a war in two African countries 
(the U.S. homeland is especially unlikely to be harmed in this scenario), concerns over threat to 
one’s home country is not likely to be a factor in causing anger’s increase in support for war. In 
the present studies, we gathered information on participants’ citizenship. Non-American citizens 
did not show different patterns of war attitudes than U.S. citizens. However, these non-citizens 
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were students currently residing in America, so they were clearly not detached from any threat 
towards America, and thus this is not an alternative to this proposed research design.  
  Another area that has not been investigated is anger’s possible affect on implicit war 
attitudes. Anger may be affecting positivity towards war at a more unconscious level and the 
explicit, self-report measures used in all past research is not able to capture these changes in 
implicit beliefs. Participants may be unaware of how their war attitudes have changed.  Or they 
may be unwilling to report their increased war support, due to factors such as social desirability 
and a preference to appear anti-war (especially because college campuses are generally quite 
“dovish” regarding war). An implicit war attitude measure may be a way to diminish this 
potential problem.   
Alternative Measurement of Potential Mediators 
Temporal Orientation 
 Future studies should also continue to investigate potential mechanisms that explain why 
anger causes an increase in favorability towards military conflict. The present results suggest that 
considering the present consequences of the war instead of the future consequences is one way 
anger affects war attitudes. I believe researchers should continue to examine CFC in the context 
of emotion and aggressive acts such as war attitudes to better understand its role as a potential 
mediator or moderator of this effect.  Using CFC as a trait (rather than state) variable may 
provide additional insight into the role of temporal orientation and war.  
 Another approach would be to directly manipulate the extent to which people are 
thinking about the present and future consequences of their actions.  The study could consist of a 
“present orientation” condition, a “future orientation” condition, and a control condition. The 
two experimental conditions would differ in that the present group would be instructed to read 
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the passage while keeping in mind the short term advantages and disadvantages of the war 
scenario while the future condition would be asked to think long term.  Both groups would then 
write out their reasons for their respective time periods. My prediction is that the present 
orientation condition would show higher levels of support than the control or future condition.  
 It is important to remember that CFC is only one particular way of measuring temporal 
orientation. There are a number of constructs that measure thinking about the present versus the 
future that would be extremely important to measure as potential moderators or mediators for the 
anger – war relationship. One of these constructs is delay discounting. Delay discounting is 
people’s tendency to choose a smaller, but immediate reward instead of a delayed, larger reward 
(Green & Myerson, 2010). This can be viewed as a maladaptive strategy because in the long run, 
it results in smaller gains. Although most individuals tend to show some degree of discounting, 
people who are more present-orientated show higher rates of discounting because they tend to 
overvalue rewards in the present even more than the average person.  
 Delay discounting can be measured in various ways, but a common method is to present a 
series of choices in which there is a reward that can be attained in the present versus a larger 
reward in the future (i.e. $650 now OR $1,000 in ten years). Participants are given a number of 
combinations of choices varying in size of the rewards and the amount of time for the delayed 
reward. A delay discounting score for each person is calculated based on factors such as when 
the individual begins to switch over to picking the immediate reward instead of the delayed 
reward (and vice versa depending on what was first given to the participant). This measure, 
along with other related constructs such as delay of gratification (Metcalf & Mischel, 1999) and 
time perspective (Zimbardo, 1999), would serve as quality alternative methods of assessing 
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temporal orientation in an anger and war attitudes study, providing us with a clearer 
understanding of the role of temporal orientation in the anger – war relationship.  
 One area of psychological research that has provided unique insight on temporal 
orientation, anger, and aggression is clinical psychology. Although CFC has not, to my 
knowledge, been studied in the clinical literature, another related time orientation-based 
construct that has an important role for psychopathology is impulsivity.   
 Research indicates that anger and impulsivity may interact in a way that amplifies their 
effects within specific clinical disorders and pathological behaviors. For example, research 
shows that anger and impulsivity both affect the likelihood of physical abuse for patients with 
Borderline Personality Disorders (Dutton & Starzomski, 1993). Furthermore, anger and 
impulsivity are important for diagnosing and understanding Psychopathy (Jackson, Neumann, & 
Vitacco, 2007) and impulsivity has been found to moderate the relationship between anger and 
eating disordered behavior in bulimic patients (Engel, Boseck, Crosby, Wonderlich, Mitchell, 
Smyth, Miltenberger, & Steiger, 2007). In addition to the clinical research on anger and 
impulsivity, studies have indicated that impulsiveness can lead to more aggressive behaviors. 
Impulsivity is a prominent personality variable associated with alcoholism (Sher & Trull, 1994; 
Whiteside & Lynam, 2009) and leads to various negative consequences including physical 
altercations and other forms of violence (Park, 2004). Also, impulsivity is associated with more 
aggressive behaviors such as spousal abuse, especially in men with Antisocial Personality 
Disorder and Borderline Personality Disorder (Edwards, Scott, Yarvis, Paizis, & Panizzon, 
2003). This relationship between anger, impulsivity, and aggressive behaviors in the clinical 
literature suggest that anger and time orientation can be studied outside of the domain of CFC.  
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Therefore, it is important for future research to investigate if impulsivity plays a role in 
understanding how anger causes changes in an aggressive attitude construct such as war support.   
 CFC is associated with a number of pro-social outcomes such as recycling, (Strathman et 
al., 1994) lower rates of substance abuse (Strathman et al., 1994) higher GPAs (Joireman, 1999) 
and engaging in higher rates of physical activity (Ouellette, 2005). There is a strong case to make 
that if more individuals were orientated towards long-term consequences rather than short-term 
consequences, it could have a number of important positive effects on society. Unfortunately, 
there is no direct evidence of interventions increasing individuals’ motivation or ability to 
consider future consequences. However, there is some indirect evidence that treatments can 
affect time orientation and subsequent behavior. This evidence from the clinical literature shows 
that a number of treatments have been designed to decrease impulsivity and make fewer 
decisions that are focused on the short-term that result in negative consequences. This research 
shows that treatments such as Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, Self-Statement Modification and 
Modeling treatments have been at least mildly effective in treating impulsivity in disorders such 
as Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and Conduct Disorder based on a meta-analysis of 
impulsivity and treatments in children by Bear & Nietzel (1991). Based on these findings, 
researchers should continue to investigate the methods in which people can alter their behavior to 
consider future consequences more thoroughly and thus make decisions that benefit the 
individual as well as society as a whole. 
Risk 
 In my results, the concepts of risk perception and risk preference did not prove to be 
related to either anger or war. As noted previously, the lack of an anger – risk relationship was 
especially surprising considering results of past research, that used very similar methods to those 
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used in the present study. With this in mind, future research should employ different measures of 
risk perception and risk preference to further investigate if they are indeed important constructs 
in the anger – war relationship. One potential obstacle is that there appears to be very few 
general measures of risk perception (Olofsson & Rashid, 2011). The majority of scales for both 
risk perception and risk preference are created to address risk in specific domains such as driving 
(White, Eiser, & Harris, 2004), sexual behaviors (Adefuye, Abiona, Balogun, & Lukobo-Durrell, 
2009), environmental issues (Peters & Slovic, 1996), and health concerns (Watson, Lloyd, 
Meyer, Eeles, Ebbs, & Murday, 1999), and not to assess an individual’s “overall” level of risk 
perception.  
 Of course, a single risk perception measure of driving behaviors is unlikely to be a valid 
measure of one’s general risk perception and thus cannot be used to measure risk perception in a 
differing paradigm such as anger and war. However, one way to get a general sense of risk 
perception is to use a number of items from all these different domains.  For example, picking 
one item from a risk perception measure of HIV, another from climate change concern, and so 
forth could allow for a more broad measure of someone’s current risk perception. With this type 
of measure, one could then investigate how risk perception is related to anger and war attitudes. 
 Another approach to measuring risk perception is to create a measure in which 
participants are given specific scenarios and asked how likely the negative outcome is to occur. 
For example, participants can be provided a scenario in which a driver is stopped at a red light 
and takes a right turn without looking for oncoming cars on a busy road.  Then ask the 
participant, “how likely is it that the driver will get into an auto accident if this act is performed”.  
Participants can respond using an 11-point scale, with each scale point representing a percentage 
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from the range of 0% to 100%. Using a number of these items in different risky domains, one 
can obtain a measure of an individual’s risk perception.  
 The process of selecting alternative measures of risk preference has similar obstacles to 
measuring risk perception. That is, most risk preference measures are specific to a particular risk 
domain. Luckily the same solution can be applied to risk preference. Using different risk 
preference tasks over various areas should provide a general sense of one’s level of risk-taking.  
 It is unclear exactly why the measures used in the present study did not replicate previous 
research. However, because these data did not match the predicted hypotheses, further research 
in this area should attempt alternate means of measuring these important constructs.  
Cognitive Control 
 The present results did not suggest that there is a cognitive control element to the anger 
and war relationship. Cognitive control is a broad concept and the antisaccade task I used is 
clearly not the only way of capturing everything that is associated with cognitive control. One 
simpler way to measure if cognitive abilities in general affect attitudes towards war would be to 
randomly assign participants to either a cognitive load manipulation or a control group and then 
measure war attitudes. If participants in the cognitive load condition express more support for 
war than the control group, it would suggest that a reduction in cognitive abilities does increase 
support for war. Because heuristic processing can be due to a lack of cognitive resources, this 
would suggest that war support and processing information in a less detailed way are related 
concepts. 
 Aside from cognitive measures, one avenue would be to assess information processing 
style (heuristic versus systematic) directly by using a measure that gives each participant a 
processing style score. However, studies that measure processing style routinely use measures 
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that determine whether heuristic or systematic processing merely exists. Importantly, these 
studies do not award a particular processing style value for each participant. Without a score of 
information processing, one cannot use the processing variable to determine if it moderates or 
mediates the anger – war relationship. For example, Tiedens and Linton (2001) showed that 
anger is related to heuristic processing through an expertise/persuasion paradigm. In their study, 
participants that completed an anger manipulation were more persuaded by an essay written by 
“experts” than by presumed non-experts on the subject. Control group participants did not favor 
one essay over the other. Both essays were identical except for the essay’s formatting and the 
occupation of the author. Thus, it appeared that participants in the anger condition were relying 
more heavily on the cue of presumed expertise to make their judgments of the essay than 
participants in the control group. This reliance on expertise was because participants were using 
a more heuristic processing style when consuming the content within the essay. This is a fine 
study for understanding if anger affects processing style, but this type of study does not assign a 
value for each person’s level of processing. Without a value for processing style, it is not 
possible to test for moderation or mediation. Because most, if not all, processing style studies use 
similar methods, there is currently no clear method for determining the degree to which 
processing style moderates or mediates anger and war studies.  
 A measure that is somewhat close to being a direct measure is the well-known Need for 
Cognition scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). However, this scale, which investigates the degree to 
which people prefer engaging in effortful cognitive activities, is used at the trait-level and is not 
devised to measure changes in processing style due to manipulated incidental emotion. Need for 
Cognition would be an interesting construct to test for its possible relationship with state or trait 
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anger and whether it is related to support for military conflict, but it would not be a good 
candidate to understand changes in processing style due to an anger manipulation. 
A FINAL WORD 
 Steven Pinker (2012) and other prominent scholars have argued that violence and war 
across the globe are currently at their lowest levels in human history.  Although this belief very 
well may be accurate, it is quite unlikely that war will ever be completely eradicated from the 
human experience. Because violence and aggression are ever-present aspects of humanity, it is 
vital that the scientific community continues to probe attitudes towards war to understand their 
genesis and why they persist despite the negative outcomes that they generate. I believe 
emotions, including anger, are extremely important factors in the development of both pro and 
anti-war attitudes. This is important to understand not just in the context of public opinion, but 
also for the political and military leaders that ultimately make the life and death decisions 
involving international and intranational conflict. With continued research and exploration of 
these important ideas, we may one day understand the mechanisms that shape our beliefs and 
behaviors concerning war and all forms of violence with the aim of reducing their devastating 
impact. 
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Footnotes 
 1
 It may seem odd that positive life events could be considered a measure of “risk”. 
However, both serve as general measures of optimism, which is believed to be a very similar 
construct to risk perception. Lerner & Keltner (2001) also used both positive and negative event 
estimates to measure risk perception, and that was the approach taken here.  Responses to 
negative and positive events were correlated (r = .25, p = .003). When separating risk perception 
into negative and positive events, both constructs showed somewhat similar relationships 
between the key variables of interest. Combining both to form the measure of risk perception 
produces very good reliability alpha = .74.
  
2
 For Experiment1, war attitudes were measured before war risk for all participants. In 
Experiment 2, the order of presentation for war attitudes and war risk was counterbalanced. 
Results showed presentation order had no effect on scores. Experiment 2 was conducted 
chronologically before Experiment 1. Because there were no order effects, the war attitudes 
measure was presented before the war risk measure for Experiments 1 and 3.   
 
3
 An important assumption in an analysis of covariance is the homogeneity of regression 
slopes assumption. Initial analyses of anger, controlling for anxiety, were consistent with this 
assumption.  However, analyses of covariance using sadness were not. Thus, for the ANCOVA 
with condition as the independent variable and anger as the dependent variable, only anxiety is 
included as a covariate in the results to be reported ahead.  
 4
 Based on the recommendation from Aiken and West (1991) all regression coefficients 
reported will be unstandardized Bs instead of the standardized Betas reported for all other 
regression analyses.   
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 5
 In the classic Asian Disease Problem scenario, the outbreak is described as an “unusual 
Asian disease”. Because the hypothetical war scenario in the present study involved Asian 
countries (North and South Korea) the word “Asian” was replaced with the word “toxic” to 
avoid any possible issue that this overlap may create. 
 6
 Payne (2005) presented the target object for 100 ms. However, in piloting this task, very 
few errors were recorded for either block 1 or block 2 at this presentation speed. A presentation 
of 60ms did result in more errors, and thus this speed was used in the present experiment.  
 7
 Tests of the homogeneity of regression slopes assumption reveled that the sadness X 
condition interaction was significant, F(1,117) = 10.00, p = .002. Thus only anxiety and not 
sadness was included as a covariate in the ANCOVA with condition as the independent variable 
and anger as the dependent variable.  
 
8 
In contrast, a key advantage of using a hypothetical war scenario is that participants 
cannot have pre-existing attitudes towards the studied conflict. These pre-existing attitudes are 
likely to harden their opinions, and thus be less malleable to the impact of an angering 
experience.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics – Mean levels for each construct. Standard Deviation in parentheses.  
CFC = Consideration of Future Consequences. 
 
       Experiment 1  Experiment 2  Experiment 3  
1. Trait Anger    4.26 (1.07)  4.38 (1.17)  4.11 (1.16) 
2. Trait Aggression    3.25 (1.14)  3.12 (0.94)  3.42 (1.07) 
3. Sensation Seeking   5.70 (1.60)  5.66 (1.51)  6.16 (1.45) 
4. Political Orientation  3.68 (1.03)  3.66 (1.23)  3.65 (1.27) 
5. Right-Wing Authoritarianism 2.69 (1.05)  2.71 (1.00)  2.73 (0.99) 
6. Social Dominance Orientation 3.16 (1.15)  3.00 (1.23)  3.12 (1.25) 
7. Pre Manipulation Anger  2.04 (1.25)  1.81 (1.10)  2.07 (1.24) 
8. Post Manipulation Anger  2.50 (1.67)  2.19 (1.51)  2.68 (1.90) 
9. War Attitudes   3.58 (1.66)  3.92 (1.65)  3.81 (1.73) 
10. War Risk    3.77 (1.10)  4.15 (1.09)  3.77 (0.93) 
11. CFC    6.07 (1.23)  N/A   N/A 
12. Risk Perception   N/A   4.07 (0.83)  N/A 
13. Cognitive Control Errors   N/A   N/A   6.60 (4.87) 
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Table 2 
Correlation Among and Internal Reliabilities of Individual Difference Variables – Experiment 1 
 
       1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
1. Trait Anger    (.83) -- -- -- -- -- -- --       -- 
2. Trait Aggression    .54*** (.84) -- -- -- -- -- --       -- 
3. Sensation Seeking   -.13 .20* (.82) -- -- -- -- --       -- 
4. Political Orientation  .06 .06 .05 (.72) -- -- -- --       -- 
5. Right-Wing Authoritarianism .21* .17†
 
.00 .58*** (.88) -- -- --       -- 
6. Social Dominance Orientation .25** .30** .00 .40*** .22* (.91) -- --       -- 
7. Pre Manipulation Anger  .39*** .29** .01 .15 .20* .15 (.85) --       --  
8. Pre Manipulation Anxiety  .36*** .08 -.04 -.02 .09 .13 .56*** (.80) -- 
9. Pre Manipulation Sadness    .40*** .09 -.16 .01 .14 .07 .62*** .65*** (.82)  
Note. 
†
p < .10.
 
 
*
p < .05. 
**
p < .01.  
***
p < .001. 
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Table 3 
Correlation Among and Internal Reliabilities of Post Manipulation Mood Indices - Experiment 1 
      1  2  3   
1. Anger Index  (.93)  --  --   
2. Anxiety Index   .36***  (.86)  --   
3. Sadness Index            .69***  .59***  (.81)   
Note. 
†
p < .10.
 
 
*
p < .05. 
**
p < .01.  
***
p < .001. 
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Table 4 
 
Correlation Among and Internal Reliabilities of Moderators of Anger – War relationship – Experiment 1 
 
    1  2  3  4 
1. Gender   --  --  --  -- 
2. CFC    .14  (.86)  --  -- 
3. Trait aggression  -.31**  -.10  (.84)  -- 
4. Political Orientation -.37*** -.17†
  
.06  (.72)    
Note. Gender coded such that 1 = male and 2 = female.  
 
†
p < .10.
 
 
*
p < .05. 
**
p < .01.  
***
p < .001.  CFC = Consideration of Future Consequences Scale. 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1 
Overview of proposed mediators/moderators. 
Figure 2 
Schematic overview of design of Experiments 1 – 3.  
Figure 3 
Regression Analyses of Gender as a moderator of the Anger and War Attitudes Relationship in 
Experiment 1. Values are controlling for condition and premeasured anger.  
Figure 4 
Regression Analyses of Political Orientation as a moderator of the Anger and War Attitudes 
Relationship in Experiment 1. Values are controlling for condition and premeasured anger.  
Figure 5 
Regression Analyses of Trait Aggression as a moderator of the Anger and War Attitudes 
Relationship in Experiment 1. Values are controlling for condition and premeasured anger.  
Figure 6 
Regression Analyses of Consideration of Future Consequences as a moderator of the Anger and 
War Attitudes Relationship in Experiment 1. Values are controlling for condition and 
premeasured anger.  
Figure 7 
Statistical paths of relevant variables in Experiment 1. All values are standardized beta 
coefficients. Values are controlling for condition and premeasured anger. Values in parentheses 
reflect the simple relation of the variables question. CFC was coded such that higher scores 
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indicate higher concern for immediate consequences rather than future consequences. 
†
p < .10.
 
 
*
p < .05. 
**
p < .01. 
***
p < .001. 
Figure 8 
Males only. Statistical paths of relevant variables in Experiment 1. All values are standardized 
beta coefficients. Values are controlling for condition and premeasured anger. Values in 
parentheses reflect the simple relation of the variables question. CFC was coded such that higher 
scores indicate higher concern for immediate consequences rather than future consequences. 
†
p < 
.10.
 
 
*
p < .05. 
**
p < .01. 
***
p < .001. 
Figure 9 
Females only. Statistical paths of relevant variables in Experiment 1. All values are standardized 
beta coefficients. Values are controlling for condition and premeasured anger. Values in 
parentheses reflect the simple relation of the variables in question. CFC was coded such that 
higher scores indicate higher concern for future consequences rather than immediate 
consequences. 
†
p < .10.
 
 
*
p < .05. 
**
p < .01. 
***
p < .001. 
Figure 10 
Statistical paths of relevant variables in Experiment 2. All values are standardized beta 
coefficients. Values are controlling for condition and premeasured anger. Values in parentheses 
reflect the simple relation of the variables question. Risk Perception was coded such that higher 
scores indicate perceptions of higher levels of risk. 
†
p < .10.
 
 
*
p < .05. 
**
p < .01. 
***
p < .001. 
Figure 11 
Statistical paths of relevant variables in Experiment 3. All values are standardized beta 
coefficients. Values are controlling for condition and premeasured anger. Values in parentheses 
reflect the simple relation of the variables question. Errors were coded such that higher scores 
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indicate higher levels of errors and thus less cognitive control abilities. 
†
p < .10.
 
 
*
p < .05. 
**
p < 
.01. 
***
p < .001. 
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Figure 1A (mediation) 
  
Experimental manipulation of 
anger 
 
Experimental manipulation of 
anger 
 
Time Perspective 
Cognitive Control 
Risk Perception/ 
Preference 
 
War Attitudes 
 
War Attitudes 
Time 
Perspective 
 
Risk 
Perception/ 
Preference 
 
Cognitive 
Control 
 
Figure 1B (moderation) Couldn’t it be both? 
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Figure 3 (Experiment 1)  
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Figure 4 (Experiment 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1 SD Below 1 SD Above 
W
ar
 S
u
p
p
o
rt
 
Anger 
Political Orientation 
High Political Orientation 
(Conservatives) 
Mid Level Political Orientation 
Low Political Orientation (Liberals) 
110 
 
Figure 5 (Experiment 1) 
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Figure 6 (Experiment 1) 
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Figure 7 (Experiment 1: All participants) 
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Figure 8 (Experiment 1: Males only) 
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Figure 9 (Experiment 1: Females only) 
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Figure 10 (Experiment 2) 
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Figure 11 (Experiment 3) 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Trait Anger 
1. I have a fiery temper. 
2. I am quick-tempered. 
3. I am a hotheaded person. 
4. I get annoyed when I am singled out for correction. 
5. It makes me furious when I am criticized in front of others. 
6. I get angry when I am slowed down by others mistakes. 
7. I feel infuriated when I do a good job and get a poor evaluation. 
8. I fly off the handle. 
9. I feel annoyed when I am not given recognition for doing good work. 
10. People who think they are always right irritate me. 
11. When I get mad, I say nasty things. 
12. When I get frustrated, I feel like hitting someone. 
13. It makes my blood boil when I am pressured. 
 
Trait Aggression 
Physical Aggression 
1. Once in a while I can't control the urge to strike another person.  
2. Given enough provocation, I may hit another person.  
3. If somebody hits me, I hit back.  
4. I get into fights a little more than the average person. 
5. If I have to resort to violence to protect my rights, I will.  
6. There are people who pushed me so far that we came to blows.  
7. I can think of no good reason for ever hitting a person. 
8. I have threatened people I know. 
9. I have become so mad that I have broken things. 
 
Verbal Aggression 
1. I tell my friends openly when I disagree with them. 
2. I often find myself disagreeing with people. 
3. When people annoy me, I may tell them what I think of them.  
4. I can't help getting into arguments when people disagree with me.  
5. My friends say that I'm somewhat argumentative. 
 
Sensation Seeking Scale 
1. I would like to explore strange places.  
2. I would like to take off on a trip with no pre-planned routes or timetables.  
3. I get restless when I spend too much time at home.  
4. I prefer friends who are excitingly unpredictable.  
5. I like to do frightening things.  
6. I would like to try bungee jumping.  
7. I like wild parties.  
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8. I would love to have new and exciting experiences, even if they are illegal. 
 
Political Orientation 
1. I consider myself to be politically liberal. 
2. I consider myself to be politically conservative. 
Economic conservatism 
3. It would be better for America to have a publicly funded health care system for all Americans 
rather than a for-profit private health care system. 
4. The U.S. Government already spends too much giving money to the poor.  
5. All the regulations placed on American business by the government are harming the economy 
by not allowing the free market to work as it should.   
6. Rich Americans should have to pay more in taxes than they currently do. 
Toughness conservatism 
7. It would be good if we had more immigrants in the United States. 
8. I support “English only” laws requiring all government business to be conducted in English. 
9. The death penalty should be eliminated from the American judicial system. 
Moral conservatism 
10. There should be few limitations on abortion in this country. 
11. Terminally ill people should have the right to physician-assisted suicide. 
12. I support full legalization of homosexual marriage. 
 
 
Social Dominance Orientation 
1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.  
2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.  
3. It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.  
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.  
5. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.   
6. It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.  
7. Inferior groups should stay in their place.  
8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.  
9. It would be good if groups could be equal.  
10. Group equality should be our ideal.  
11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.  
12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.  
13. Increased social equality.  
14. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.  
15. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.  
16. No group should dominate in society.  
 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
1. The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the radicals and 
protestors are usually just "loud mouths" showing off their ignorance. 
2. Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the 
radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us. 
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3. It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in the government and 
religion than to listen to the noisy rabble rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in 
people's minds. 
4. Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every bit 
as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly. 
5. Our country needs free thinkers who will have the courage to defy traditional ways even if this 
upsets many people. 
6. Our country will be destroyed one day if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our 
moral fiber and traditional beliefs. 
7. Everyone should have their own life-style, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it 
makes them different from everyone else. 
8. The "old-fashioned ways" and "old-fashioned values" still show the best way to live. 
9. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil and take us 
back to our true path. 
10. God's laws about abortion, pornography, and marriage must be strictly followed before it is 
too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished. 
11. There is no "ONE right way" to live life; everybody has to create their own way. 
12. There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for 
their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action. 
13. What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in unity. 
14. It's better to have trashy magazines and radical pamphlets in our communities than to let the 
government have the power to censor them. 
15. A lot of our rules regarding modesty and sexual behavior are just customs which are not 
necessarily any better or holier than those which other people follow. 
16. The situation is getting so serious, the strongest methods would be justified if they eliminated 
the troublemakers and got us back on our true path. 
17. Once our government leaders give us the "go ahead," it will be the duty of every patriotic 
citizen to help stomp out the rot that is poisoning our country from within. 
 
Risk Perception - Likelihood of life events  
Positive 
1. Good job offer before graduation 
2. Graduating in top third of class 
3. Home doubles in value in 5 years 
4. Your work recognized with award 
5. Living past 80 
6. Your achievements in newspaper 
7. No night in hospital for 5 years 
8. Having a mentally gifted child 
9. Marrying someone wealthy 
10. Statewide recognition in your profession 
11. Weight constant for 10 years 
 
Negative 
1. Having a drinking problem 
2. Attempting suicide 
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3. Divorced a few years after married 
4. Heart attack before age 40 
5. Contracting venereal disease 
6. Being fired from a job 
7. Getting lung cancer 
 
Consideration of Future Consequences 
1. I consider how things might be in the future, and try to influence those things with my day to 
day behavior. 
2. Often I engage in a particular behavior in order to achieve outcomes that may not result for 
many years. 
3. I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring the future will take care of itself. 
4. My behavior is only influenced by the immediate (i.e., a matter of days or weeks) outcomes of 
my actions. 
5. My convenience is a big factor in the decisions I make or the actions I take. 
6. I am willing to sacrifice my immediate happiness or well-being in order to achieve future 
outcomes. 
7. I think it is important to take warnings about negative outcomes seriously even if the negative 
outcome will not occur for many years. 
8. I think it is more important to perform a behavior with important distant consequences than a 
behavior with less-important immediate consequences. 
9. I generally ignore warnings about possible future problems because I think the problems will 
be resolved before they reach crisis level. 
10. I think that sacrificing now is usually unnecessary since future outcomes can be dealt with at 
a later time. 
11. I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring that I will take care of future problems that 
may occur at a later date. 
12. Since my day to day work has specific outcomes, it is more important to me than behavior 
that has distant outcomes. 
 
U.S.-N. Korea scenario attitudes 
1. Under these circumstances, the United States should immediately begin bombing North 
Korea. 
2. America would be completely justified in attacking N. Korea. 
3. America should not go to war with North Korea, more diplomacy should be used to resolve 
the situation.   
4. It would be a huge mistake for the United States to attack N. Korea. 
5. The United States should invade N. Korea. 
6. The United States should begin to move soldiers into S. Korea in order to advance into N. 
Korea. 
7. Under the current circumstances, I do not support going to war with N. Korea. 
8. The United States should use all force necessary to protect S. Korea from N. Korea. 
9. The United States should not go to war with N. Korea because the U.S. cannot constantly get 
involved with other countries’ affairs. 
10. The tensions between S. Korea and N. Korea are none of the United States’ business. 
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11. It would be irresponsible for the United States not to attack N. Korea if they begin to invade 
S. Korea. 
12. The United States will look weak if they do not engage militarily with N. Korea.  
 
U.S. - N. Korea outcome likelihood estimates (risk perceptions): 
1. If the United States were to attack North Korea, there would be a high probability that the U.S. 
would meet its objectives. 
2. It would be risky for the United States to engage in a military conflict with North Korea, given 
the hypothetical situation presented in the passage. 
3. The United States will be able to stop N. Korea from invading S. Korea through military force. 
4. N. Korea poses a great risk to the United States. 
5. I believe at least 5,000 United States soldiers will die if America invades N. Korea. 
6. I believe at least 50,000 civilians will die if the United States invades N. Korea. 
7. If the United States were to invade N. Korea the U.S. would have to keep soldiers in N. Korea 
for as long as the U.S. has in Iraq, if not longer. 
8. A war against N. Korea would not cost the United States nearly as much monetarily as in the 
war in Iraq.   
9. There is not much risk involved for the United States in attacking N. Korea. 
10. There is a good probability that the benefits of going to war with N. Korea will outweigh the 
benefits of going to war for the United States.   
 
 
 
 
